METHODS OF FORCEFUL INDOCTRINATION:
OBSERVATIONS AND INTERVIEWS

Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry
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The meeting of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, held at the Berkeley-Carteret Hotel, Asbury Park, New Jersey, on Sunday, November 11, 1956.

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Dr. Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., The New York Hospital
Dr. Ginsburg: I would like now to turn the meeting over to John Lilly.

Dr. John C. Lilly: Last April we began this symposium, and we hope to conclude it today. The first half of this subject last April considered that which is known about certain physical factors in weakening personalities, with special reference to increasing the susceptibility to forced indoctrination. We talked about the lack of sleep, starvation, pain, brain injury, and isolation.

This morning we are considering the psychological processes of thought reform and indoctrination with force, or "brainwashing", or whatever you wish to call these processes. The term "brainwashing" has come apparently to have a meaning created by the national press. In this meaning the term is more or less defined by an indoctrinator in the following quotation; the indoctrinator is talking to his victim: "We make the brain perfect before we blow it up. No one whom we bring to this place ever stands out against us. Everyone is washed clean. There is nothing left in them except sorrow for what they have done and love of the party. It is touching to see how they love the party. They beg to be shot quickly so that they can die while their minds are still clean."

Apparently this is one source for this term "brainwashing" and its definition. George Orwell not only wrote a great novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, but he wrote a disturbing handbook for brainwashers which convinced his readers of the reality of an extreme form of forcible indoctrination. Orwell's victim, Winston Smith, was subjected to social isolation, solitary confinement, starvation, lack of sleep, physical beatings, personal betrayal, personal humiliation, treatments with drugs, torture and direct electrical stimulation
to his brain. He was told and shown that he was completely powerless, that any possible rescuers were probably fictitious, that the party could and would control his thoughts, and finally that he would love no one and nothing but the party. Apparently Orwell did such a convincing job on his readers that any types of involuntary indoctrination are thought popularly to correspond to Orwell’s single definitive process scientifically applied by men trained to a fine point, all of whom are as fanatical as O’Brien was in Nineteen Eighty-Four.

I spent this time on this fantasy because today we are asking the speakers and their officially appointed discussant to clarify the differences between the fantastic account of Orwell and the real processes actually used in authentic cases.

Our first speaker is Dr. Robert J. Lifton, a Research Associate at Harvard Medical School in the Department of Psychiatry of the Massachusetts General Hospital who will talk under the title of “Psychiatric Aspects of Chinese Communist Thought Reform”.

**Dr. Robert J. Lifton:** I am very glad that Dr. Lilly pointed up some of the misunderstanding about the term “brainwashing”. I am going to mention it right now at the very beginning primarily to dismiss it. For our purposes it no longer means anything specific, particularly in view of the manner in which it has been used in this country.

I think it is very significant that among all of the people I interviewed in Korea and in Hong Kong, no one who had been through the experience ever used the term “brainwashing”, unless he had first heard it from a Western source. But in searching for a term, or trying to label this process, one runs into a little difficulty.

I remember one suggestion that came to me which may for some people shed some light on the subject. A friend of ours in Hong Kong, a member of the British Diplomatic Service, felt there was too much concern on the part of Americans about “brainwashing”, and he particularly deplored the name. He suggested, “Why not simply call the whole thing a ‘mental douche’?” But I am not too sure that this would serve as a very scientific name.

But despite much confusion in terminology, the process of su-hsiang kai-tsao — translated as “ideological remolding”, “ideological reform”, or “thought reform” — is very much a reality. Where applied to Westerners, to either prisoners of war or to incarcerated civilians, many of its methods have been written about popularly, and have to a certain extent, been subjected to psychiatric and psychological investigation. But the process applied to the Chinese themselves, and particularly to Chinese intellectuals, has been very little studied.

For this reason, and also in keeping with GAP’s policy of trying to present a certain amount of unpublished research, I am going to talk about the most intensive of the “thought reform” programs for Chinese intellectuals as conducted in special institutions known as “revolutionary colleges”. These were set up all over China immediately after the Communist takeover.

I wish first to emphasize that thought reform has been applied, in varying degrees of intensity, not only in the special centers I will describe, but also in universities, labor, business and government groups, even among peasants—and in fact throughout the immense population of China. This is in itself a rather amazing accomplishment.

I had the opportunity to study this process in Hong Kong over a period of 17 months, working with twenty-five Westerners who had been in Chinese prisons, and with fifteen Chinese intellectuals who had undergone the type of process I am going to describe.

Although I could occasionally conduct interviews in English, where the subjects had been exposed to a Westernized education (generally in mission-endowed institutions), I usually worked through interpreters. That set up a very complicated three-way communication system, which I won’t discuss now. I found that it was very important to work with a subject over a long period of time, and the most meaningful data that I was able to obtain came through working with people for over a year. There is a very simple reason for this. It is a Chinese — and East Asian — cultural trait to say what one thinks the listener wants to hear, as a form of politeness and propriety. So I would first encounter many cliche anti-communist statements; one could only get into the real areas of conflict when there developed a meaningful and trusting relationship, and when the subject could realize that I wanted to know about his true feelings.

THE REVOLUTIONARY COLLEGE

Who attends a revolutionary college? Students are drawn from many divergent sources: former Nationalist officials and affiliates, teachers who had been associated with the old regime, Communist cadres who had demonstrated significant “errors” in their work or thoughts, party members who had spent long periods of time in Nationalist areas, students returning from the West, and finally, arbitrarily selected groups of university instructors or recent graduates. Many in these groups came in response to thinly veiled coercion — the strong “suggestion” that they attend; but others actively sought admission on a voluntary basis, in order to try to fit in with the requirements of the new regime, or at least to find out what was expected of them.

The college itself is tightly organized along Communist principles of “democratic centralism”. One center may contain as many as 4,000 students, subdivided into sections of about 1,000 each, then into classes of 100 to 200 each, and finally into six- to ten-man groups. The president of the institution may be a well-known scholar serving as a figurehead; technically below him in rank are a vice-president and the section heads, who are likely to be Communist Party members, and exert the real authority at the center. Under their supervision are the class-heads, each of whom works with three special cadres.

These cadres, usually long-standing and dedicated party workers, play a central role in the thought reform process; they are the connecting link between the faculty and the students, and it is they who perform the day-to-day leg work of the reform process. The three cadres of each class may be designated according to function: the executive cadre, concerned essentially with courses of study; the organizing cadre, most intimately involved with the structure and function of the small group and the attitudes of the individual students who make them up; and the advisory cadre — the only one of the three who may be a woman — offering counsel on personal and ideological “problems” which come up during this arduous experience.

I have divided the “thought reform” process into three stages, referring to the successive psychological climates which are created. These are my subdivisions, but I believe that they are very much in keeping with the Communist view of their own process: first, The Great Togetherness — the stage of Group Identification; second, the Closing in of the Milieu — the stage of Emotional Conflict; and third, Submission and Rebirth — the Final Confession.

1. The Great Togetherness — Group Identification

New students approach the course with a varying mixture of curiosity, enthusiasm, and apprehension. When a group of them arrives, their first impression is likely to be a favorable one. They encounter an atmosphere which is austere, but friendly — an open area of low-slung wooden buildings (frequently converted from military barracks) which serve as living quarters and class rooms — old students and cadres greeting them warmly, showing them around, speaking glowingly of the virtues of the revolutionary college, of the Communist movement, of the new hope for the future. Then, after a warm welcoming speech by the president of the college, they are organized into ten-man study groups. And for a period of from a few days to two weeks they are told to “just get to know each other”.

Students are surprised by this free and enthusiastic atmosphere: some among the older ones may remain wary, but most are caught up in a feeling of camaraderie. Within the small groups they vent their widely shared hostility towards the old regime—an important stimulus to the thought reform process. There is a frank exchange of feeling and ideas, past and present, as they discuss their background experiences, and hopes and fears for the future. There is an air of optimism, a feeling of being in the same boat, a high esprit de corps.

Let me illustrate this with a few sentences quoted directly from one of my subjects:

"Everyone felt a bit strange at first, but we soon realized that we were all in the same position. We all began to talk freely and spontaneously; we introduced ourselves to each other, and talked about our past life and family background... The Revolutionary College seemed to be a place which brought together young people from all over with a great deal in common. We ate, slept, and talked together, all of us eager to make new friends. I had very warm feelings towards the group and towards the school... I felt that I was being treated well in a very free atmosphere. I was happy and thought that I was on my way to a new life."

Next, through a series of “thought mobilization” lectures and discussions, the philosophy and rationale of the program are im-
pressed upon the individual student: the “old society” was evil and corrupt; this was so because it was dominated by the “exploiting classes”—the landowners and the bourgeoisie; most intellectuals come from these “exploiting classes” (or from the closely related petite bourgeoisie) and therefore retain “evil remnants” of their origins and of the old regime; each must now rid himself of these “ideological poisons” in order to become a “new man” in the “new society”. In this way, he is told, the “ideology of all classes” can be brought into harmony with the changing “objective material conditions”.

Also quoted invariably is a highly significant speech of Mao Tse-tung, the chairman of the Communist Party in China:

“...our object in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings is like that of a doctor in curing a disease. The entire purpose is to save the person, not to cure him to death. If a man has appendicitis, the doctor performs an operation and the man is saved. If a person who commits an error, no matter how great, does not bring his disease to an incurable state by concealing it and persisting in his error, and in addition if he is genuinely and honestly willing to be cured, willing to make corrections, we will welcome him so that his disease may be cured and he can become a good comrade. It is certainly not possible to solve the problem by one flurry of blows for the sake of a moment’s satisfaction. We cannot adopt a brash attitude towards diseases of thought and politics, but must have an attitude of saving men by curing their diseases. This is the correct and effective method.”

This illustrates the tone with which thought reform is presented to the student. What we see as a coercive set of manipulations, they put forth as a morally uplifting, harmonizing, and therapeutic experience.

Then the formal courses begin—the first usually entitled the History of the Development of Society (to be later followed by Lenin — the State, Materialistic Dialectics, History of the Chinese Revolution, Theory of the New Democracy, and Field Study — visits to old Communist workshops and industrial centers). The subject matter is introduced by a two- to six-hour lecture delivered by a leading Communist theorist. This is followed by the interminable hsueh hsi or study sessions within the six- to ten-man group, where the real work of thought reform takes place. Discussion of the lecture material is led by the group leader who has been elected by its members—usually because of his superior knowledge of Marxism. At this point he encourages a spirited exchange of all views, and takes no side when there is a disagreement. The other students realize that the group leader is making daily reports to a cadre or to the class head, but the full significance of these is not yet appreciated; they may be viewed as simply a necessary organizational procedure. Most students retain a feeling of pulling together towards a common goal in a group crusading spirit.

2. The Closing in of the Milieu—The Period of Emotional Conflict

About four to six weeks from the beginning of thought reform — at about the time of the completion of the first course—a change begins to develop in the atmosphere. With the submission of the first “thought summary” (these must be prepared after each course) there is a shift in emphasis from the intellectual and ideological to the personal and the emotional. The student begins to find that he, rather than the Communist doctrine, is the object of study. A pattern of criticism, self-criticism, and confession develops—pursued with increasing intensity throughout the remainder of the course.

Now the group leader is no longer “neutral”; acting upon instructions from above, he begins to “lean to one side”, to support the “progressive elements”; to apply stronger pressures in the direction of reform. He and the “activists” who begin to emerge, take the lead in setting the tone for the group. The descriptions of the past and present attitudes which the student so freely gave during the first few weeks of the course now come back to haunt him. Not only his ideas, but his underlying motivations are carefully scrutinized. Failure to achieve the correct “materialistic viewpoint”, “proletarian standpoint”, and “dialectical methodology”, is pointed out, and the causes for this deficiency are carefully analyzed.

Criticism cover every phase of past and present thought and behavior; they not only “nip in the bud” the slightest show of orthodoxy or nonconformity, but they also point up “false progressives”—students who outwardly express the “correct” views without true depth of feeling. Group members are constantly on the lookout.

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for indications in others of lack of real emotional involvement in the process. Each must demonstrate the genuineness of his reform through continuous personal enthusiasm, and active participation in the criticism of fellow students. In this way he can avoid being rebuked for “failure to combine theory with practice”.

Standard criticisms repeatedly driven home include: “individualism”—placing personal interests above those of “the people”—probably the most emphasized of all; “subjectivism”—applying a personal viewpoint to a problem rather than a “scientific” Marxist approach; “objectivism”—undue detachment, viewing oneself “above class distinction”, or “posing as a spectator of the new China”; “sentimentalism”—allowing one’s attachment to family or friends to interfere with reform needs, therefore “carrying about an ideological burden” (usually associated with reluctance to denounce family members or friends allegedly associated with the “exploiting classes”). And in addition: “deviationism”, “opportunism”, “dogmatism”, “reflecting exploiting class ideology”, “overly technical viewpoints”, “bureaucratism”, “individual heroism”, “revisionism”, “departmentalism”, “sectarianism”, “idealism”, and “pro-American outlook.”

The student is required to accept these criticisms gratefully when they are offered. But more than this, he is expected to both anticipate and expand upon them through the even more important device of self-criticism. He must correctly analyze his own thoughts and actions, and review his past life—family, educational, and social—in order to uncover the source of his difficulties. And the resulting ‘insights’ are always expressed within the Communist jargon—corrupt “ruling class” and “bourgeois” influences, derived from his specific class origin.

The criticism and self-criticism process is also extended into every aspect of daily life, always with a highly moralistic tone. Under attack here are the “bourgeois” or “ruling class” characteristics of pride, conceit, greed, competitiveness, dishonesty, boastfulness, and ruddiness. Relationships with the opposite sex are discussed and evaluated, solely in terms of their effects upon the individual’s progress in reform. Where a “backward” girl friend is thought to be impeding his progress, a student may be advised to break off a liaison; but if both are “progressive”, or if one is thought to be aiding the other’s progress, the relationship will be condoned. Sexual contacts are, on the whole, discouraged, as it is felt that they drain energies from the thought reform process.

The student must, within the small group, confess all of the “evils” of his past life. Political and moral considerations here become inextricably merged; especially emphasized are any “reactionary” affiliations with the old regime or with its student organizations. Each student develops a “running confession”, supplemented by material from his self-criticisms and “thought summaries”; its content becomes widely known to students, cadres, and class heads, and it serves as a continuous indicator of his progress in reform.

Most are caught up in the universal confession compulsion which sweeps the environment: students vie to outdo each other in the frankness, completeness, and luridity of their individual confessions; one group challenges another to match its collective confessions; personal confession is the major topic of discussion at small group meetings, large student gatherings, informal talks with cadres, and in articles in wall newspapers. Everywhere one encounters the question: “Have you made your full confession?”

Confession tensions are brought to a head through a mass, pre-arranged, revival-like gathering where a student with a particularly evil past is given the opportunity to redeem himself. Before hundreds or even thousands, of fellow students, he presents a lurid description of his past sins: political work with the Nationalists, anti-Communist activities, stealing money from his company, violating his neighbor’s daughter. He expresses relief at “washing away all of my sins”, and gratitude towards the Government for allowing him to “become a new man”.

As the months pass, “progressives” and “activists” take increasing leadership, aided by group manipulations by cadres and class heads. Where a group leader is not sufficiently effective, if his reports to the class head are not considered satisfactory, or where there is a general “lagging behind” in a particular group, a reshuffling of groups is engineered from above. The weak group becomes reinforced by the addition of one or two “activists”, and the former group leader, in his new group, is reduced to the level of an ordinary student. Although group leaders may still be elected by students, these shifts can insure that this position is always held by one considered “progressive” and “reliable”.

At the same time, “backward elements”—students with suspicious backgrounds, whose confessions are not considered thorough enough, who do not demonstrate adequate enthusiasm in reforming themselves and criticizing others, whose attitudes are found wanting—are singled out for further attention. Such a student becomes the
target for relentless criticism in his group; and during odd hours he is approached by other students and cadres in attempts to persuade him to mend his ways. Should he fail to respond, friendliness gives way to veiled threats, and he may be called in to receive an official admonition from a class head. As a last resort, he may be subjected to the ultimate humiliation of a mass "struggle" meeting; in ritualistic form, he is publicly denounced by faculty members, cadres, and fellow students, his deficiencies reiterated and laid bare. It becomes quite clear that his future in Communist China is indeed precarious, and the ceremony serves as a grim warning for other students of questionable standing.

In response to all of these pressures, no student can avoid experiencing some degree of fear, anxiety, and conflict. Each is disturbed over what he may be hiding, worried about how he may come out of this ordeal. Some, recalling either stories they have heard or personal experiences, find revived in their minds images of the extreme measures used by the Communists in dealing with their enemies. All are extremely fearful of the consequences of being considered a "reactionary".

I can again illustrate this through the feelings expressed by another one of my subjects:

"Towards the middle of the semester the intensity of my anti-Communist thoughts greatly increased. I developed a terrible fear that these thoughts would come out and be known to all, but I was determined to prevent this. I tried to appear calm but I was in great inner turmoil. I knew that if I kept quiet no one would know the secret which I had not confessed. But people were always talking about secrets. In small group meetings or large confession meetings, everyone would say that it was wrong to keep secrets, that one had to confess everything. Sometimes a cadre or a student would mention secrets during a casual talk, and I would feel very disturbed. Or at large meetings someone would get up and say: 'There are still some students in the University who remain "anti-organization".' I knew that no one else was thinking specifically of me, but I couldn't help feeling very upset. The secret was always something that was trying to escape from me."

Students who show signs of emotional disturbance are encouraged to seek help by talking over their "thought problem" with the advisory cadre, in order to resolve whatever conflicts exist. Many experience psychosomatic expressions of their problems—fatigue, insomnia, loss of appetite, vague aches and pains, or gastrointestinal symptoms. Should they take their complaints to the college doctor, they are apt to encounter a reform-oriented and psychosomatically sophisticated reply: "There is nothing wrong with your body. It must be your thoughts that are sick. You will feel better when you have solved your problems and completed your reform." And indeed, most students are in a state of painful inner tension; relief is badly needed.

3. Submission and "Rebirth"—the Final Confession

The last stage—that of the over-all thought summary or final confession—supplies each student with a means of resolving his conflicts. It is ushered in by a mass meeting at which high Communist officials and faculty members emphasize the importance of the final thought summary as the crystallization of the entire course. Group sessions over the next two or three days are devoted exclusively to discussions of the form this summary is to take. It is to be a life history, beginning two generations back and extending through the reform experience. It must, with candor and thoroughness, describe the historical development of one's thoughts, and the relationships of these to actions. It is also to include a detailed analysis of the personal effects of thought reform.

The summary may be from five to twenty-five thousand Chinese characters, (roughly equivalent numerically to English words) and require about ten days of preparation. Each student then must read his summary to the group, where he is subjected to more prolonged and penetrating criticism. He may be kept under fire for several days of detailed discussion and painful revision, as every group member is considered responsible for the approval of each confession presented, and all may even have to place their signatures upon it.

The confession is the student's final opportunity to bring out anything he has previously held back, as well as to elaborate upon everything he has already said. It always includes a detailed analysis of class origin. And in almost every case, its central feature is the denunciation of the father, both as a symbol of the exploiting classes, and as an individual. The student usually finds the recitation of his father's personal, political, and economic abuses to be the most painful part of his entire thought reform. He may require endless prodding, persuasion, and indirect threats before he is able to take this crucial step. But he has little choice and he almost invariably complies.
The confession ends with an emphasis of personal liabilities which still remain, attitudes in need of further reform, and the solemn resolve to continue attempts at self-improvement and to serve the regime devotedly in the future. When his confession is approved, the student experiences great emotional relief. He has weathered the thought reform ordeal, renounced his past, and established an organic bond between himself and The Government. His confession will accompany him throughout his future career as a permanent part of his personal record. It is his symbolic submission to the regime, and at the same time his expression of individual rebirth into the Chinese Communist community.

COMMENT

Although there is not time for much detail, I would like to say a few words about the types of response to the process and the degree of success it seems to achieve, and then indicate what I believe to be some of the more important psychiatric principles it employs and their possible relevance for psychiatric theory and research.

In commenting on the success or failure of thought reform, I can only make what I believe to be a reasonably well-informed speculation, based upon the experiences and observations of my subjects, as well as opinions of many others who have had an opportunity to observe its results first-hand. We may roughly identify three types of responses: first, the resisters who felt suffocated by the process, some of whom fled (and I would emphasize that my subjects were limited to "failures"). Some of them had been much more sympathetic to the regime prior to their thought reform, experiencing a reverse effect. But this group would seem to be a small minority. Second, on the other extreme there are the dramatic "converts"—especially among those in their teens and early twenties—who become zealous adherents of the Communist movement. The third, in-between group would appear to be by far the largest, partially convinced but essentially concerned with adapting themselves to these severe pressures and working out some type of future under the new regime. Their attempts to find a way of life and a form of personal identity become more decisive to them than theoretical ideas and beliefs. Some of the people in the second and third groups seem to feel "purified" by the process, the emotional equivalent of taking "bad medicine" which was unpleasant but "good for me."

Finally, in listing the important psychological areas involved, I wish to stress that the four which I will mention are among the most relevant for us here, but by no means the only ones.

1. Milieu Control. This is the term which I have used to describe the attempt at manipulation of all communication in the environment. Everything said or done can be observed and reported back to a cadre or faculty member, and the information used to specify further manipulations within the group. This type of closed communication system is very close to Orwell's vision of Nineteen Eighty-Four; but Orwell, with the mind of a Westerner, saw milieu control accomplished through mechanical means, the two-way telescreen. The Chinese have here done it through a human recording and transmitting apparatus, extending their influence more deeply into the inner life of the individual person. There is a blending of external and internal milieux, as the student internalizes the attitudes, values, and beliefs of his environment.

What is the significance of this for psychiatry? In some of our own approaches we attempt to create what we consider to be a therapeutic milieu: in the past we emphasized the "total push" within the mental hospital and more recently we have begun to study not only the complicated relationships within the hospital structure, but also the wider milieux with which we must deal in preventive and public health psychiatry. My work with "thought reform" convinces me that we would do well to retain a certain degree of humility in our own milieu manipulations, and to keep in mind the dangers of imposing too forcefully our own values and prejudices. I believe that psychiatrists are beginning to deal with this question in the more creative type of milieux which their studious efforts have helped to develop in various treatment centers.

2. Guilt, Shame, and Confession. Thought reform pressures strongly stimulate both guilt anxiety and shame anxiety. I am here using the concepts developed in recent studies of guilt and shame: guilt anxiety, consisting of feelings of evil and sinfulness with expectation of punishment, shame anxiety of feelings of humiliation and failure to live up to the standards of one's peers or of one's own internalized ego-ideal, with the expectation of abandonment. The

student develops a sense of guilt relating to the evils of his past life and further stimulated through his denunciation of his father; he develops a sense of shame through the manifold group pressures, particularly those related to ostracism and public humiliation. The experience here seems to confirm the view that both the sense of guilt and the sense of shame are likely to play important roles in any culture, and that we must reexamine some of our concepts of guilt and shame cultures. It may be, however, that the shame pressures which function so prominently in the operation of the process are drawn largely from Chinese culture, and that many of the guilt pressures stem from the Communist ideology and frame of reference which has its origins in the West.

In theorizing concerning the individual sources of this guilt, one thinks first of the traditional view, its restimulation from the store of guilt originating in real or alleged transgressions of parental authority during early life. But there is in addition the creation of what may be termed a guilty environment. In this atmosphere of accusation, self-accusation, and confession, one is expected to feel guilty, and one must learn to feel guilty. A sense of guilt becomes a form of adaptation as well as a means of communication in this milieu. The same is true of a sense of shame, and we may speak of a shaming environment. Similarly, confession becomes not only a means of atoning for guilt and shame, but also a vehicle for making “progress” and bettering one’s standing. In the purging environment, self-debasement leads to increased prestige.

I believe that many questions concerning the nature of guilt, shame, and confession can be further explored through intensive studies of their occurrence in people of other cultures.

3. Language, Theory, and Behavior. In thought reform there is a loading of the language to an extreme degree. Such terms as “liberation,” “help,” “progress,” “the people”; “proletarian standpoint,” “bourgeois,” and “capitalistic” become morally charged — either very good or very bad — and they take on a mystical quality. Catch-phrases and semantic manipulations are so prominently developed that the student must find himself thinking and conceptualizing within their sphere. One of them described this to me as follows:

“Using the same pattern of words for so long, you are so accustomed to them that you feel chained. If you make a mistake, you make a mistake within the pattern. Although you don’t admit that you have adopted this kind of ideology, you are actually using it subconsciously, almost automatically. . . . At that time I believed in certain aspects of their principles and theories. But such was the state of confusion in my own mind that I couldn’t tell or make out what were the things I did believe in.”

Thought reform is based upon an implied psychological theory — not completely spelled out but very much present: that adult behavior, attitudes, values, and psychological reactions are determined by one’s class origin. Negative qualities such as greed, lack of consideration for others, and the inability to adequately achieve the proletarian standpoint, are attributed to exploiting class origins. More positive qualities of cooperativeness, consideration, and “progressive thought” are ostensibly derived from working class origins. Most of us in Western psychiatry would feel that this theory has severe limitations in explaining human behavior, but in the thought reform milieu it can be made to “work.” It is rendered effective by the total support of the milieu and by the discomfort experienced by those who would, through action or statement, bring it into question. In this way, a limited, or even a poorly conceived, theory can become not only an explanation of behavior but also a fulcrum for action.

In our psychiatric work, we are faced with somewhat analogous problems of language and theory. We too must consider the danger of loading of the language with concepts which become morally charged, and in their routine and unquestioned usage lose their original vitality and narrow the scope of our thinking. In evaluating our theories, we are not free of emotional involvements which influence our beliefs: where we disagree with prevailing points of view, we too may encounter pressures in the direction of guilt and shame anxiety, contrasting with the relief of conflict and reinforcement of a positive identity when we accept opinions held in our particular milieu. But equally irrational factors may also be related to the need to rebel against a particular point of view.

4. Changes in Identity and Belief. I feel that the thought reform pressures are primarily aimed at bringing about a shift in identity (applying the concept as developed by Erik H. Eriksen7) in the

participating students, both collectively and individually. Traditionally, in Chinese culture, one has well-delineated social roles which are usually defined within the family constellation: the stress was on duty and reciprocal help, but especially upon filial piety. But under the impact of the industrial age, and of strong Western influence, this structure has been under attack by vanguard intellectual groups for at least fifty years, and in the ferment which developed, the young intellectual found himself torn between such identities as that of the rebellious reformer, the uninvolved cynic, and the more traditional filial son. The Communists seek to resolve all existing confusion through supplying a common identity — that of the zealous participant in the new regime. They can readily make use of that of the rebellious reformer, and without too much difficulty undermine that of the uninvolved cynic; but the identity of the filial son has the deepest emotional roots and is the most difficult to change. Thus, the denunciation of the father becomes the central symbolic act of the reform process. The student casts off the old symbol of family and institutional authority, to become an equally filial and loyal "son" in a greater family, that of the Communist regime. The shifts in identity and belief follow those which occur in any ideological or religious conversion: old identities first must become associated with guilt and shame, they are cast out by means of the confession or "emptying" process, and the "convert" emerges with a new or modified identity whose basic alterations have been supplied by the prevailing milieu. I would also emphasize that, in addition to coercive pressures, the process is furthered by powerful psychological appeals: the "great togetherness" already described, the rewards of catharsis and self-surrender in sharing the strength of a greater power, the bond of participation in a vast "moral crusade," and the overwhelmingly powerful psychological appeal of nationalism, which embodies all these other elements.

It is quite clear then that thought reform resembles, in many features, an induced religious conversion, as well as a coercive form of psychotherapy. These comparisons can be made profitably, but should not be put forth loosely. There remain important differences among these various approaches to "changing" the individual person. Psychiatry remains quite distinct from religious and ideological "conversion" experiences through a constant reexamination of its goals and its premises, the continuous and critical evaluation of its methods and of the personal involvements of its practitioners. I believe that these are principles to which this particular organization has been very actively devoted.

I would like to close with an emphasis which is perhaps already clear. The psychological forces we encounter in thought reform are not unique to the process; they represent an exaggerated expression of elements present in varying degrees in all social orders. The extreme character of thought reform offers a unique opportunity to recognize and study them. Every culture makes use of somewhat analogous pressures of milieu control, guilt, shame and confession, group sanctions, and loading of the language, in order to mold common identities and beliefs. The problem of any democratic society, including our own, is that of limiting these pressures and achieving a balance in a manner which permits its people to retain feelings of individual freedom, of dignity, and of creativity.

 Moderator Lilly: Thank you, Dr. Lifton. This interesting paper is now open for discussion by the membership.

 Dr. Osborn: Could I ask Dr. Lifton one thing? What tradition was there in the background of Chinese culture for an experience of this sort? I have recently been reading some of the literature and it appears in the relationship between the master and pupil, which sometimes to our way of looking is a rather vigorous sort, that this would not be entirely foreign to the Chinese background. There are many, many accounts of extraordinary amounts of intensity in this relationship. One of the best accounts I have seen tells of a pupil who after having been with the master seven years and beaten vigorously with a large stick on every possible occasion had become rather adept at getting out of its way. One day when the master was eating, the pupil saw the cudgel lying by his side. He picked it up and dealt a tremendous blow to the worthy man's head. With tremendous dexterity the master caught it on the soup tureen. The pupil then understood the great mercy and kindness of the master. This conclusion I think is quite astonishing to the Western mind.
Dr. Lifton: To consider the tradition for this movement, I think it is necessary to examine its two most important elements: the Chinese and the Communist. The forms of the process — confession, criticism, self-criticism — have long been found in international Communist practice. But the nuances of group and individual psychological pressures have, I believe, been largely contributed by the Chinese. I also think that the emphasis upon “reeducation” and “reform” is also very “Chinese”, contrasting with the Russian emphasis upon confession, followed by the “purge”. I believe that it stems from earlier Chinese cultural influences, particularly Confucianism, in which there was always tremendous emphasis upon “self-cultivation” and reform. It is interesting that the Communist leaders, although they condemn Confucius and the older philosophers as “idealistic”, often themselves quote Confucius and Mencius as examples in “self-cultivation” for good Communists to follow. There are also elements in the process that go against Chinese culture: particularly the denunciation of the father, and public acts of criticism and humiliation. But it is important to remember here that the Communists are riding on a wave of rebellious counter-trends — severe criticism of traditional values, and especially those of the family — which began more than fifty years ago, long before the Communist take-over.

To sum up (although not finally answer the question) there are so many elements in the process which apply to things in various cultures that it is terribly hard to label a particular thought reform practice as definitely “Buddhist” or “Christian”, although both of these influences are also present. In presenting some of this material before very diverse groups of people, it has been very interesting to observe the particular elements in the process with which they identify their own experiences. In many ways it represents what is universal in attempts to persuade and “change” other human beings.

Dr. Henry Brosin: In the same vein, to what extent is the exploitation of the Pavlovian theory implicit?

Dr. Lifton: My feeling is that there has been a lot of misunderstanding about this question. I have never seen any evidence that there have been any deliberate, conscious application of Pavlovian theory. Whether there is an implicit or unconscious use of Pavlovian theory would be hard to say. Through what I could discover, I believe that the process has evolved mainly in a pragmatic, trial-and-error fashion, with the Chinese making use of their own (and Communist) political and cultural forms. We can, of course, interpret the process in various ways, whether psychoanalytic or Pavlovian. But I think that the absolute assertion that this is an application of Pavlovian theory is a kind of myth which has evolved in journalistic and other professional circles.

Dr. James G. Miller: I am a little puzzled as to what position you are taking about the similarity between the brainwashing that you have described and the religious conversion of the typical Fundamentalist group of 25 years ago. You say that they have a good deal in common as far as the fundamental psychological processes behind are concerned, yet at another point you say they are quite different and it is important to distinguish them. In what way do you distinguish them and in what way are they the same?

Dr. Lifton: I am not terribly familiar with the fundamentalist type of religion. I did compare religious and ideological versions, but did not attempt to make a complete statement about their differences, although I think they do differ. They are quite the same in the accusation and guilt-stimulation processes. In the general “conversion” process—one seeks a new identity which rids one of guilt by means of the confession or “empting” process. I believe that they differ in the specific nature of some of the group processes, and also in the elaborate ideology and intellectual structure which Communism supplies. The distinction I was emphasizing was that between organized psychiatric methods and those of ideological and religious conversion—a distinction I think that we should maintain.

Dr. Lief: I have been impressed with the Chinese language. It lends itself more to an analysis of feelings and motives than English, for example, and I was wondering whether you found this to be true, and if true, was this a help or hindrance in the process of thought reform?

Dr. Lifton: I cannot speak as an expert here but I would say this: the Chinese language tends to be more symbolic and suggestive, and in this sense is a help in achieving distortions and minor shifts in points of view which are useful to the thought reform process. Whether or not this is better geared for expression of emotions I really don’t know. I would say that it is quite possible.
I have developed an additional impression which I think is important in seeking some understanding of the source of this psychological know-how. The Chinese Communists do not appear to use any organized psychology in a Western sense, but I am struck by their cultural heritage in this respect, one which has always emphasized human relationships. I believe that the Chinese have become especially skillful in learning how to meet the psychological needs of other people and to manipulate them. One finds much evidence of this if one works with Chinese people, and reports in the literature have indicated similar impressions. Although this may not sound like a very scientific theory, I think that we see in thought reform the perversion of a cultural genius. I believe that all of this must be related to the language, but I do not know enough about the language itself to say more.

Dr. Mendel: I am wondering whether they had evolved any fixed size of group; the small group and the larger group.

Dr. Lifton: From everything I have been able to learn, the groups always seem to be about the size I mentioned, anywhere from six to ten men. This was at least true for the small group which was the place where the real work of thought reform occurred. There are other types of gatherings—large groups or big public meetings as well as individual interviews or admonitions—but most of the thought reform processes take place in this small group.

Dr. Cohen: From what you said I think they are very effective. What I would like to know is why our methods don’t work as well as theirs do.

Dr. Lifton: Methods such as these seem to be most effective when the entire culture is supporting their purposes and their results. I think that this is the reason why thought reform by and large seems to work much more with Chinese than with Westerners: the Chinese intellectual must remain within the Chinese Communist culture which constantly reinforces and furthers his thought reform experience. The Westerner goes back to a world which creates different demands upon him. And the Chinese of course understand their own people better and can more readily communicate with them. Whether our own culture does or does not support our goals in psychotherapy, I would leave for others to decide. I would add that it is at this point very difficult to make any definite statement about the degree of success of the thought reform process.

Moderator Lilly: The next speaker will be Dr. Edgar H. Schein, Assistant Professor in the School of Industrial Management at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He will speak to us on “Patterns of Reactions to Severe Chronic Stress in American Army Prisoners of War of the Chinese”.

Dr. Edgar H. Schein: In this paper I would like to outline some of the constellations of stresses which prisoners of war faced during the Korean conflict, and to describe some of the reaction patterns to these stresses. I cannot present a complete catalogue of the men’s experiences in a limited time. Therefore, I have selected those aspects which seem to me to throw some light on the problem of collaboration with the enemy. I will give particular emphasis to the social psychological factors, because the Chinese methods seem to emphasize control over groups, rather than individuals.

My material is based on a variety of sources. I was in Korea during the repatriation, and had the opportunity to interview extensively 20 unselected repatriates. This basic material was supplemented by the information gathered by three psychiatrists, Drs. Harvey Strassman, Patrick Israel, and Clinton Tempereau, who together had seen some 300 men. On arrival home, I also had the opportunity to sit in on bull sessions among repatriates in which many of the prison experiences were recapitulated. Back in the states I obtained additional details from Army dossiers on the men.

This interview material is supplemented with projective test data on some 200 men and objective test data on 750, obtained within one to two weeks following repatriation. The testing program was set up with Capt. Harold Williams. I want to thank him, Dr. Margaret Singer, Dr. Winfred Hill, and Dr. Ardie Lubin who have all worked with me on this project and have contributed significantly to it. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Dr. David Rioch and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.

The typical experience of the prisoner of war must be divided into two broad phases. The first phase lasted anywhere from one to six months beginning with capture, followed by exhausting marches to the north of Korea and severe privation in inadequately equipped temporary camps, terminating finally in the assignment to a permanent prisoner of war camp.

The second phase, lasting two or more years, was marked by chronic pressures to collaborate and to give up existing group
loyalties in favor of new ones. While physical stresses had been
outstanding in the first six months, psychological stresses were
outstanding in this second period.

The reactions of the men toward capture were influenced by their
overall attitude toward the Korean situation. First, many of them
felt inadequately prepared, either physically or psychologically. The
physical training, equipment, rotation system, and leadership all
came in for retrospective criticism, though this response might have
been merely a rationalization for being captured. On the psycho-
logical side, the men were not clearly aware what they were fighting
for or what kind of enemy they were up against.

Second, the reports of the atrocities committed by the North
Koreans led most men to expect death, torture, or non-repatriation
if captured.

Third, the Chinese entrance into the war was marked by their
penetration into rear areas where they captured many men who
were taken completely by surprise. The men felt that when positions
were over-run, their leadership was often less than adequate. Thus,
many men were predisposed to blame the UN command for the
unfortunate event of being captured.

It was in such a context that the soldier found his Chinese captor
extending his hand in a friendly gesture and saying "Welcome" or
"Congratulations, you’ve been liberated". This Chinese tactic was
part of their ‘lenient policy’ which was explained to groups of
prisoners shortly after capture in these terms: because the UN had
entered the war illegally and was an aggressor, all UN military
personnel were in fact criminals, and could be shot summarily.
But the average soldier was, after all, only carrying out orders for
his leaders who were the real criminals. Therefore, the Chinese
soldier would consider the POW to be a ‘student’, and would teach
him the ‘truth’ about the war. Anyone who did not cooperate by
going to school and learning voluntarily, could always be reverted
to his ‘war criminal’ status and shot, particularly if a confession of
‘criminal’ deeds could be obtained.

In the weeks following capture, the men were collected in large
groups and marched north. From a physical point of view, the
stresses during these marches were very severe: there was no
medicine for the wounded, the food was unpalatable and insuffi-
cient, especially by our standards, clothing was scarce in the face
of severe winter weather, and shelter was inadequate and over-
crowded. The Chinese set a severe pace and showed little consid-
eration for the weariness that was the product of wounds, diarrhea,
and frostbite. Men who could not keep up were usually abandoned
or had to be helped by their fellows. The men marched only at
night, and were kept under cover during the day, ostensibly as
protection against being strafed by our own planes.

From a psychological point of view this situation can best be
described as a chronic cycle of fear, relief, and new fear. The men
were afraid that they might die, that they might never be repatri-
ated, that they might never again have a chance to communicate
with the outside, and that no one even knew they were alive. The
Chinese, on the other hand, were reassuring and promised that the
men would be repatriated soon, that conditions would improve, and
that they would soon be permitted to communicate with the outside.

What made matters worse was the disorganization within the
prisoner group itself. It was difficult to maintain close group ties
if one was competing with others for the essentials of life, and if
one spent one’s resting time in overcrowded huts among others who
had severe diarrhea and were occasionally incontinent. Lines of
authority often broke down, and with this, group cohesion and
morale suffered. A few men attempted to escape, but they were
usually recaptured in a short time and returned to the group. The
Chinese also fostered low morale and the feeling of being aban-
donned, by systematically reporting false news about United Nation
defeats and losses.

In this situation goals became increasingly short-run. As long as
the men were marching, they had something to do and could look
forward to relief from the harsh conditions of the march. However,
arrival at a temporary camp was usually a severe disappointment.
Not only were physical conditions as bad as ever, but the sedentary
life in overcrowded quarters produced more disease and still lower
morale.

What happened to the men under these conditions? During the
one to two week marches they became increasingly apathetic. They
developed a slow plodding gait, called by one man ‘prisoners’
shuffle’. Uppermost in their minds were fantasies of food: men
remembered all the good meals they had ever had or planned
detailed menus for years into the future. To a lesser extent they
thought of loved ones at home, and about cars which seemed to
them to symbolize freedom and the return home.
In the temporary camps disease and exposure took a heavy toll in lives. But it was the feeling of many men, including some of the doctors who survived the experience, that some of these deaths were not warranted by a man's physical condition. Instead, what appeared to happen was that some men became so apathetic that they ceased to care about their bodily needs. They retreated further into themselves, refused to eat even what little food was available, refused to get any exercise, and eventually lay down and curled up, as if waiting to die. The reports were emphatic concerning the lucidity and sanity of these men. They seemed simply to give up and accept the prospect of death rather than to continue fighting a severely frustrating and depriving environment.

Two things seemed to save a man who was close to 'apathy' death: getting him on his feet and doing something, no matter how trivial, or getting him angry or concerned about some present or future problem. Usually it was the effort of a friend who maternally and insistently motivated the individual toward realistic goals which snapped him out of such a state of resignation. In one case such "therapy" consisted of kicking the man until he was mad enough to get up and fight.

Throughout this time, the Chinese played the role of the benevolent but handicapped captor. Prisoners were always reminded that it was their own Air Force bombing which was responsible for the inadequate supplies. Furthermore, they were reminded that they were getting treatment which was just as good as that which the average Chinese was getting. One important effect of this was that a man could never give full vent to his hostility toward the Chinese, even in fantasy. In their manner and words they were usually solicitous and sympathetic. Also, in their manner, the Chinese implied that conditions could be better for a prisoner if he would take a more 'cooperative' attitude, if he would support their propaganda for peace. Thus a man was made to feel that he was himself responsible for his traumatic circumstances.

Arrival at a permanent camp usually brought some relief from many of the physical hardships which I have just described. Food, shelter, and medicine, while not plentiful, appeared to be sufficient for the maintenance of life and some degree of health. However, the Chinese now increased sharply their efforts to involve prisoners in their own propaganda machine, and to undermine loyalties to their country. This marks the beginning of the second phase of the imprisonment experience.

The Chinese program of subversion and indoctrination was thoroughly integrated into the entire camp routine and it is likely that its aims were broad and inclusive. Managing a large group of prisoners with a minimum staff of guards, indoctrinating them with the communist political ideology, interrogating them to obtain intelligence information and confessions for propaganda purposes, and developing a corps of collaborators within the prisoner group were all carried out within a single framework of techniques. These techniques involved the manipulation of the entire social milieu in which the prisoners existed. What success the Chinese had, stemmed from this total control of the environment, not from the application of any one technique.

The most significant feature of Chinese prisoner camp control was the systematic destruction of the prisoners' formal and informal group structure. Soon after arrival at a camp, the men were segregated by race, nationality, and rank. The Chinese put their own men in charge of the platoons and companies, and made their own selections of POW squad leaders, usually on some arbitrary basis, to remind the prisoners that their old rank system no longer had any validity. In addition, the Chinese attempted to undermine informal group structure by prohibiting any group meetings such as religious services, and by systematically fomenting mutual distrust by playing men off against one another. The most effective device to this end was the practice of obtaining from informers or Chinese spies detailed information about someone's activities, no matter how trivial, then calling him in and interrogating him about it. Such detailed surveillance of the men's activities led them to feel that their own ranks were so infiltrated by spies and informers that it was not safe to trust anyone.

A similar device was used in obtaining information during interrogation. After a man had resisted giving information for hours or days, he would be shown a signed statement by one of his fellow prisoners giving that same information. Still another device was to make prisoners who had not collaborated, look like collaborators by bestowing special favors upon them.

If the men, in spite of their state of social disorganization, did manage to organize any kind of group activity, the Chinese would quickly break up the group by removing its leaders or key members.

Loyalties to home and country were undermined by the systematic manipulation of mail. Usually only mail which carried bad
news was delivered to a man. If he received no mail at all, it was pointed out to him that his loved ones must have abandoned him.

Feelings of social isolation were further heightened by the complete information control maintained in the camps. Only the communist press, radio, magazines, and movies were allowed.

The undermining of the prison social structure is particularly significant because we depend to such an extent on consensual validation for judging ourselves and others. The prisoners lost their most important source of information and support concerning standards of behavior and beliefs. Often men who attempted to resist the Chinese by means other than outright obstruction or aggression, failed to obtain the active support of others, often earning their suspicion instead. This kind of social isolation is different from the physical isolation that is often associated with Russian confession extraction.

At the same time the Chinese did create a situation in which meaningful social relationships could be obtained through common political activity, such as the ‘peace’ committees which served as propaganda organs. As an additional outlet, Chinese interrogators or instructors offered some men close personal relationships by living with them for long periods of time and establishing an air of familiarity with them.

The Communist point of view was presented through compulsory lectures followed by compulsory group discussions, the purpose of which was to justify the conclusions given at the end of the lectures. On the whole, this phase of indoctrination was ineffective because of the crudeness of the propaganda, though its constant repetition seemed eventually to influence those men who did not have well formed political opinions to start with, particularly because no counter-arguments could be heard.

More successful was the Chinese use of testimonials from other prisoners, such as the false germ-warfare confessions, and appeals based on familiar contexts, such as peace appeals. Confessions by prisoners or propaganda lectures given by collaborators had a particularly demoralizing and undermining effect, because only if resistance had been unanimous could a man solidly believe that his values were correct, even if he could not defend them logically.

Throughout, the Chinese created an environment in which rewards such as extra food, medicine, special privileges, and status in the prison camp hierarchy followed cooperation and collaboration; while threats of death, non-repatriation, reprisals against families, torture, decreases in food and medicine, and imprisonment served to keep men from offering much resistance. Only imprisonment was consistently used as an actual punishment. Chronic resistance was usually handled by transferring the prisoner to a so-called ‘reactionary’ camp.

Whatever behavior the Chinese attempted to elicit, they always paced their demands very carefully, they always required some level of participation from the prisoner, no matter how trivial, and they always repeated endlessly.

To what extent did these pressures produce changes in beliefs and attitudes, or collaboration? I don’t think the Chinese had much success in changing beliefs and attitudes. Doubt and confusion was produced in many prisoners as a result of having to examine so closely, their own way of thinking, but very few changes, if any, occurred that resembled any degree of conversion to Communism. The type of prisoner who was most likely to become sympathetic toward Communism was the one who had chronically occupied a low status position in this society and for whom the democratic principles were not very salient or meaningful.

In producing collaboration, however, the Chinese were far more effective. By collaboration I mean such activities as giving lectures for the Communists, writing and broadcasting propaganda, giving false confessions, writing and signing petitions, informing on fellow POWs and so on; none of which required a personal change of belief. Some 10 to 15 per cent of the men chronically collaborated, but the dynamics of this response are very complex. By far the greatest determinant is the amount of pressure the Chinese put on a particular prisoner. Beyond this, the reports of the men permitted one to isolate several sets of motives that operated, though it is impossible to tell how many cases of each type there may have been.

1) Some men collaborated for outright opportunistic reasons; these men lacked any kind of stable group identification and exploited the situation for its material benefits without any regard for the consequences to themselves, their fellow prisoners, or their country.

2) Some men collaborated because their egos were too weak to withstand the physical and psychological rigors; these men were primarily motivated by fear, though they often rationalized their behavior; they were unable to resist any kind of authority figure,
and were highly susceptible to being blackmailed once they had begun to collaborate.

3) Some men collaborated with a firm conviction that they were infiltrating the Chinese ranks and obtaining intelligence information which would be useful to the Army. This was a convenient rationalization for anyone who could not withstand the pressures. Many of these men were initially tricked into collaboration or were motivated by a desire to communicate with the outside world. None of the types mentioned thus far became ideologically confused; what communist beliefs they might have professed were for the benefit of the Chinese only.

4) The prisoner, who was vulnerable to the ideological appeal because of his low status in this society, often collaborated with the conviction that he was doing the right thing in supporting the communist peace movement. This group included the younger and less intelligent men from backward or rural areas, the malcontents, and members of various minority groups. These men often viewed themselves as failures in our society and felt that society had never given them a chance. They were positively attracted by the immediate status and privileges which went with being a 'progressive', and by the promise of important roles which they could presumably play in the peace movement of the future.

Perhaps the most important thing to note about the production of collaboration is the manner in which the social disorganization contributed to it. A man might make a slanted radio broadcast in order to communicate with the outside, he might start reading communist literature out of sheer boredom, he might give information which he knew the Chinese already had, and so on. Once this happened, however, the Chinese rewarded him, increased pressure on him to collaborate, and blackmailed him by threatening exposure. At the same time his fellow prisoners, often unwittingly, forced him into further collaboration by mistrusting him or ostracizing him. Thus a man had to stand entirely on his own judgment and strength, and both of these often failed. One of the commonest failures was a man's judgment concerning the effects of his own actions on the other prisoners, and the value of these actions for the Chinese propaganda effort. The man who confessed to germ warfare, thinking he could repudiate such a confession later, did not realize its propaganda value to the communists.

A certain percentage of men, though the exact number is difficult to estimate, exhibited chronic resistance and obstructionism toward Chinese indoctrination efforts. Many of these men were well integrated, had secure, stable group identifications, and could withstand the social isolation and still exercise good judgment. Others were chronic obstructionists whose histories showed recurring resistance to any form of authority. Still others were idealists or martyrs to religious and ethical principles, and still others were anxious, guilt-ridden individuals who could only cope with their own strong impulses to collaborate by denying them and over-reacting in the other direction.

By far the largest group of prisoners, however, established a complex compromise between the demands of the Chinese and their own value systems. This adjustment, called by the men 'playing it cool', consisted primarily of a physical and emotional withdrawal from the whole environment. These men learned to suspend their feelings and to adopt an attitude of watching and waiting, rather than hoping and planning. This reaction, though passive was not as severe as the apathy described earlier. It was a difficult adjustment to maintain because some concessions had to be made to the Chinese in the form of trivial or well timed collaborative acts, and in the form of a feigned interest in the indoctrination program. At the same time, each man had to be prepared to deal with the hostility of his buddies if he made an error in judgment.

The test material which we have on prisoners was gathered some 1 to 2 weeks following repatriation. At that time the passive response which I have just described was still very evident in the majority of the group. Men who fell into the passive neutral group in terms of camp adjustment showed highly constriicted Rorschach records and told short, bland TAT stories. On the other hand, there was a marked tendency for men who had collaborated to show less of this constriction, as one would expect, if one considers that these men had felt no need to withdraw from the environment. Thus, it is possible to separate collaborators from neutrals at a level considerably better than chance, by using criteria such as total number of Rorschach responses, number of human movement and color responses, reaction time, and number of card rejections.

In our sample of 750 objective test protocols we have a sufficient number of resisters to enable us to compare all three groups on several other variables.
Figure 1 shows that both resisters and collaborators, the two extreme points on the graph, were interned for a longer period of time than neutrals.

*The difference between these two groups is significant at the .05 level.

**This indicates the overall significance level comparing all three groups by analysis of variance.

Figure 2 shows that the two extreme groups were in the service longer, and were older.
Figure 3 shows that the two extreme groups scored higher on the information and comprehension parts of the Wechsler-Bellevue intelligence test.

Figure 4 shows that the two extreme groups scored higher on the two parts of the Shipley-Hartford test of vocabulary and abstraction.
Figure 5 shows that the two extreme groups have a slightly higher level of education, as inferred from the number of school years completed.

Figure 6 shows that the two extreme groups tend to have higher scores on the Psychopathic Deviate scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality inventory. The scores on the anxiety and repres-
sion scales do not show a significant difference. Nor do the following variables discriminate any of the groups.

1) Occupation prior to army service.

2) Normal vs. broken home as defined in terms of the number of parents with whom a person grew up.

3) Rural vs. urban home background.

4) Location of home community geographically.

5) Religion.

6) Authoritarianism as measured by the California F Scale.

7) Rank, though the latter shows a definite trend for the extreme groups to have been higher than middle group.

None of these relationships are changed to any extent by controlling length of internment. However, it should be pointed out that the degree of relationship between our variables and the criterion of prison camp behavior is very small, even though statistically significant. The highest correlation ratio obtained was +.22 in the case of the Pd scale of the MMPI. Therefore, these results have no practical implications to speak of, though it is of interest to speculate what they might mean. You will have noted that in every case, the resisters and collaborators deviated from the neutral group in the same direction. This fact has led us to infer that the continuum which our tests seems to be discriminating is not resistance-collaboration but action-inaction. The chief contrast is between the neutrals, who defended themselves from stress with a wall of passivity, and the other two groups, both of which were characterized by some kind of positive action toward the Communists. The results just shown suggest that two complementary factors may have been operating to determine which men would respond actively and which ones passively to the stresses of prison-camp life.

One of these factors might be called self-confidence. Those men who were older, more intelligent, better educated and more experienced in the Army, may have felt more capable of taking some action. This action might have taken the form of 1) open resistance, of 2) pseudo-collaboration, which it was vainly hoped could be used as an undercover means of resistance, or of 3) genuine collaboration regarded as the best way of dealing with an otherwise hopeless situation. Those low on the variables in question might have been more hesitant to commit themselves either to open resistance or to collaboration, but rather, followed the passive middle road of the majority.

The other factor which we think may have been operating is underinhibition of acting-out tendencies. This explanation is based entirely on the Pd scale. This scale, as you know, was standardized on psychopathic deviates who are characterized by several adjustment tendencies such as difficulty with authority figures, delinquency, opportunism, and underinhibition of impulses. Since both resisters and collaborators were high on Pd, it seems reasonable to suppose that it is the underinhibition which is common to the two groups. I suggest, therefore, that both resisters and collaborators tended to be restless, under-inhibited individuals who would be more likely to do something active in a stressful situation, whether or not what they did was useful. Such men would be more willing to alienate either the Communists by active resistance or their fellow-prisoners by collaboration, while the more typical prisoners would try to avoid open breaks with either side.

Let me summarize. I have tried to outline the major stresses of imprisonment, and to show that a prevalent response to those stresses was passivity in various degrees. I have also tried to suggest that collaboration can best be understood in terms of the systematically created group disorganization in the prison camp. This disorganization prevented consensual validation, constructive group resistance, or sympathetic understanding and handling of the unfortunate prisoner whose initial collaborative acts were the product of having been duped or of showing poor judgment. Ideological involvement, I feel, was the result of a predisposition based on low status in this society.

From a personality point of view, the events in prison camp seem most intelligible if, instead of thinking about the personality dynamics underlying collaboration or resistance, we think of personalities who can handle stress by withdrawing from it versus personalities who must take some kind of action to remove it.

Moderator Lilly: Our third speaker is Dr. Louis J. West, Professor of Psychiatry, University of Oklahoma. He will speak to us on the "United States Air Force Prisoners of the Chinese Communists".
Dr. Louis J. West*: A considerable amount of valuable material on so-called brainwashing has appeared in recent months1,2,3,4,5. I would like particularly to call your attention to the publications of Segal6, Litton7, Schein8,9,10,11,12, Hinkle and Wolff13, and Biderman14 which are now or soon will be available in print.

The recent symposium at the meeting of the American Psychological Association also contained much that was of value15,16.

As a former Air Force medical officer and a current researcher on the topic of Prisoners of War, I shall attempt to present some material that may be of interest to CAP. Much of this material is derived directly from the work of Biderman14 and Sander, to whom I wish to give full credit. I also wish to acknowledge the assistance of I. E. Farber, my collaborator in the POW studies now underway at the Oklahoma Medical Center concerning Prisoners of War and their reactions to various types of stress.

Of the Air Force personnel known to have fallen into the hands of the Communist Chinese and North Korean military forces, slightly more than half have returned. Two hundred and twenty were exchanged at Little Switch and Big Switch. Subsequently four fighter pilots and an eleven-man bomber crew have also been released. Of these 225 returnees, a number have been studied in considerable detail.

There are many good reasons for studying the Air Force prisoners as a separate group. Not only were they less prepared for the conditions of captivity in which they found themselves (being plunged literally from the heights to the depths very abruptly), but the enemy also considered them as a distinct population to be handled differently from ground force prisoners.

Flying over enemy territory in Korea with the constant hazard of forced landing or parachute escape from a damaged aircraft, the airman continually faced a unique survival situation. He had no close contact with the enemy or his terrain. He was not physically toughened by the rigors of warfare on the ground. There was a violent contrast between his ordinary combat situation and the survival situation in which he suddenly found himself, far behind enemy lines and often suffering some injury received in the aircraft or in the process of getting down to the ground.

The enemy regarded the captured airman in a very special light. Our aircraft had flown far over enemy lines, often unopposed, and both military and civilian populations under Communist control were well aware of the highly effective destructive activities of U. S. Air Force operations. After February 21, 1952, when the Communists' world-wide germ warfare propaganda campaign went into high gear, the responsibility for this politically potent and highly propagandized "germ warfare" was placed by the enemy directly upon the flyers, who presumably were the instruments by which bacteriological weapons were delivered.

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There were other ways in which Air Force personnel differed from the ground force prisoners. The flyers were generally of higher rank; 70 per cent of the Air Force returnees were officers. The Air Force POW was more knowledgeable than his ground force counterpart; he had a higher degree of specialized training and technical skill; he had a better education. Fifty-three per cent of the Air Force returnees had received at least some college training, as compared with about 5 percent of the Army captives. Furthermore, air information always has a high priority, and data about aircraft equipment and training methods do not become obsolete as rapidly as do data concerning ground forces.

Thus, the Communists deemed Air Force prisoners particularly valuable for propaganda purposes and as intelligence information sources. For these and certain other reasons, the Communists chose to segregate most of their Air Force prisoners in special ways. Whereas officers and enlisted men were promptly separated among the Army captives, Air Force enlisted men were usually kept together with their officers. Many individuals were isolated for long periods of time. In addition to prolonged efforts to extract military information, extreme pressures were exerted in order to gain false propaganda confessions from the captive airmen.

Sander, Biderman, and their associates have studied the 235 Air Force returnees in considerable detail. Department of Defense teams debriefed all airmen at the time that they were returned. In addition, Air Force Intelligence (O.S.I.) conducted detailed interviews. At the Officer Education Research Laboratory, Maxwell Field, Alabama, personal interviews were conducted with a number of returnees. A follow-up attitude and opinion questionnaire was mailed to the first 200 returnees, with a 90 per cent response. It was possible for officers trained in clinical psychology and in psychiatry to participate in some of the interviewing, along with the responsible social scientists. Many interviews were tape-recorded and observed through one-way screens. A considerable amount of information has been derived from the detailed and continuing studies that were made of the repatriated airmen.

There were two aspects to the Communist exploitation of U.S. Air Force prisoners. First, they used them in ways that were quite independent of any acts of compliance on the prisoner's part. For example, they employed prisoners as hostages during peace negotiations; they used them to make the West lose face by marching defeated and bedraggled prisoners through the streets of Seoul; conversely they showed the world a picture of Communist leniency by exhibiting photographs of prisoners receiving good treatment.

It is with the second type of exploitation — Communist attempts to influence prisoners through systematic control and pressure — that we are particularly concerned. The Communists tried to get intelligence information through extensive written and oral interrogations. They tried to engage the prisoners in propaganda activities, including false confessions, peace petitions, special broadcasts and recordings, writing particular types of letters home, etc. And they tried to get the prisoners to participate in indoctrination sessions with a view toward influencing them to accept Communist ideas.

In the latter activity, the enemy met with little success. We know of no Air Force officer or enlisted man who was converted to Communism or who defected to the enemy cause. However, the enemy had a considerable degree of success in obtaining intelligence information and in forcing prisoners to engage in propaganda activities.

Of the various objectives that the Communists had in attempting to gain influence over prisoners, the most persistent and important objective appears to have been the attempt to make propaganda use of Air Force personnel primarily in connection with bacteriological warfare (BW) "confessions." Another important objective was to obtain military intelligence information. Other objectives were apparently held by the enemy to be of less importance.

From the prisoners' viewpoint, however, there was no regular or uniform sequence in which the Communists seemed to attack these objectives. There was no time when the prisoner could be sure that he was through with a particular ordeal. He could be hauled out at any time and be re-interrogated. Frequently interrogation for military information was a mere cover for getting the prisoner into the habit of compliance in talking. Interrogation toward the objective of propaganda use of prisoners might be carried on simultaneously or intermingled with interrogation for military information. Attempts at indoctrination of individuals in isolation or while undergoing interrogation could happen at any time.

Eighty-three Air Force prisoners of war who have returned (and at least one other who died as a result of efforts to coerce a confession from him) were involved in attempts to extort "germ warfare" confessions. Of these, 43 were subjected to a highly deliberate, systematic, centrally-directed campaign, carried out by the Chinese
Communists, to extort false germ warfare confessions. Eleven other Air Force prisoners of war were also put under intense pressure for confessions, although these cases are less definitely linked to the centrally-directed propaganda effort. Thirty-six of these men made some kind of confession. The Communists used 23 of these for propaganda purposes. The confessions of two Marine flyers were also widely broadcasted by the Chinese. As everyone knows, these confessions were publicized throughout the world. Films of the confessions of six of these men were shown as a part of this major propaganda effort. (See Table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS OF COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO ELICIT “CONFESSIONS” OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) FROM USAF PRISONERS OF WAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogated on BW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjected to systematic “confession” extortion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly involved in centrally directed CHICOM propaganda effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gave some “confession.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Confessions” used for propaganda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some prisoners gave in rather quickly to the demands for a false confession. Fifteen per cent of all those pressured agreed to confess after one month of pressure or less. Others held out for long periods of time, two for almost a year. Nearly a quarter of those interrogated on BW still refused to confess after 24 weeks of intense pressure (compared with 35 days required for Cardinal Mindzenty’s confession). It is difficult to determine in most cases how much of this variation was due to the differences between the strength and deterrence of the victims and how much was due to the skill and determination of the interrogators. The Communists clearly became more efficient as time went by.

The pattern of pressure by the Communists for getting false confessions, although varying in intensity, length, and sequence, was essentially as follows: Shortly after capture and initial interrogations, the prisoners were accused of having participated in germ warfare missions. For this reason, they were to be considered as war criminals, and were not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war unless they repented. They would be held in solitary confinement, and they would discuss their alleged crimes with the interrogators until they were ready to confess them. Then, as repentant criminals, there might be some hope for them. The total range of pressure is vividly described in the review of Hinkle and Wolff.

Of the 83 Air Force personnel subjected to coercion to confess to having engaged in BW, all were compelled to undergo a considerable degree of isolation. A number of other techniques were also employed in an effort to elicit compliance, but the use of isolation was one technique that appears to have been employed in virtually every case wherein a centrally-directed attempt was made to elicit a confession of germ warfare. Clearly the Communists regarded isolation as a valuable means of increasing the influenceability of individuals in their control.

Another very common method was to attempt to get a great bulk of information about the prisoner and to prepare the usual extensive life history. A tremendous repetitive barrage of questions accompanied these maneuvers. There seemed to be a particular desire on the part of the captor to elicit a feeling or admission of guilt on the part of the prisoner for some act that he had committed at some time in his life; if not an act, then an attitude or compliance with some form of social injustice, etc. An effort was then made to generalize from the legitimate confession and the legitimate guilt in such a way as eventually to bring about a general feeling of guilt and a confession of some type that could be used for propaganda purposes.

The captors constantly attempted to focus the attention of the prisoner on what they defined as his predicament, his case, or his problem. He was constantly reminded of his complete dependence on his captors. In addition there was a clear-cut restriction of all types of sensory experience. There was also a systematic debility produced by a limited diet, prolonged interrogation under extreme tension, sleep deprivation, etc. There were constant attempts to induce anxiety and despair. The pattern of debility, dependency, and dread has been tagged “DDD” and analyzed elsewhere.
A particularly effective means of inducing pain and fatigue was to subject a prisoner to prolonged interrogation while forcing him to maintain a standing position. The prisoner nearly invariably tried to obey the strict command to remain standing. The chief coercion to make the prisoner maintain this position seems to have been in the form of contumely and minor physical abuse. It was very rare that a prisoner was able to perceive that the enemy was in effect making him torture himself. Thus a considerable conflict was aroused in terms of the prisoner's attempts to remain standing (hence continuing to suffer the severe pains that often accompanied this position after many hours) and his desire to obtain rest and relief. The interrogator seemingly remained aloof from this conflict, and merely continued the endless barrage of questions often so obscure as to make it difficult for the prisoner to understand even what was expected of him.

When, after weeks or months, a POW finally complied to the extent that he agreed to sign a confession of germ warfare, this was not sufficient. For a long time subsequently he was pressed to elaborate: "Who directed this activity? When did you engage in it? What kind of germ bomb did you use? What were the targets? How many missions did you fly that were bacteriological warfare missions?" and so forth, expanding the bulky documented confession and attempting to make it sound as plausible as possible or to link it to other confessions which had been obtained. Some of these confessions were used to lecture other POWs about BW. They were also used in the attempt to provide "scientific" documentation of the BW charges by bringing them before what the Communists called the International Scientific Investigatory Commission, (consisting of Communists and fellow-travelers from various countries) which was brought to Korea to conduct the so-called impartial investigation of these charges.

People who completed BW confessions were faced with continuing demands of various kinds by the Communists on the BW issue right up to the last day of their internment. Immediately before their release there was an attempt to make all of these confessions (which had many inconsistencies in them) jibe with each other. During the Big Switch repatriation each of the people who had completed one of these BW confessions was again interrogated and forced to sign a new confession which had some inconsistent details of the old one taken out and new details put in. The POW was usually tried, found guilty, and sentenced to a prison term which was "leniently" changed to "deportation" at the time of repatriation.

Needless to say, many of these men attempted to include implausible material in their so-called confessions. They dreamed up weapons and munitions that were fantastic. They included information such as speeds and altitudes for various aircraft that were impossible. They tried to figure out the areas of technical ignorance of the interrogator and to incorporate details in their documents which he would not be able to detect, but which would be palpably false for any informed person.

Rewards for cooperation were symbolic rather than real and were unpredictably bestowed. For example, a man might be given a holiday meal to celebrate some Chinese or American holiday just before a new bout of interrogation. This was to symbolize the "good treatment" he might receive. The accomplishment of the "confession" frequently resulted in further symbols of good treatment being accorded to the POW who "confessed". However, his overall treatment was not markedly different from that of his fellows.

From the point of view of learning theory, the uncertain and frequently haphazard nature of the rewards could be expected to have two separable but related consequences. First, since rewards were not consistently associated with any particular mode of response in particular situations, any learning that occurred must have been of a very general sort, namely, understanding, anticipating, and complying with anything one's captors might require. Under these conditions, the significant cues reside in the attitude of the captor. What is learned is to satisfy the interrogator, regardless of the particular responses demanded. Second, once expectancy of reward and the skills necessary to the attainment of reward have been learned under these conditions, their very irregularity would tend to increase the persistence of both expectancy and skill. If one may generalize on the basis of many laboratory experiments with both animal and human subjects, partial and irregular reinforcement of the sort experienced by the POWs would make learning difficult, but once accomplished, both expectancies (classical conditioned responses) and skills (instrumental acts) would be extraordinarily resistant to extinction.


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From the point of view of dynamic psychology, the factors involved in the compliance and resistance of any given individual can best be understood in terms of characterological personality features and the relative effectiveness of various ego defenses. It would be naive in the light of our present knowledge of individual cases to equate any ultimate adaptive modality under this type of extreme stress with any previously existing classification of personality. I shall postpone further comment on this until the discussion period.

It is difficult to determine which among various factors in each case of a false confession were the ones crucial to the individual's final compliance. The factors most frequently mentioned by "confessors" as crucial or final were: 1) fear of non-repatriation; 2) fear of death; 3) the feeling of not being able to hold out indefinitely under pressure; and 4) hope of being treated as "a regular prisoner of war". That there were other factors of an unconscious nature will be discussed subsequently.

It now appears that most of the threats of death and non-repatriation made by the Communists against those whom they had pressured for false BW confessions were bluffs. It seems likely that some of those who confessed would not have done so if they had realized what would actually have occurred had they continued to resist. The threat of interminable interrogation would have proved untrue in many cases. It appears that if some of those who confessed had held out for only a short while longer they would have been spared further pressure to confess. This is almost certainly true of the group of prisoners who agreed to confess shortly before the deadline for their repatriation. Some of the prisoners who were subjected to pressure for BW confessions thought of the cases of Mindzenty, Oatis, Voegler, and others. "If these people could eventually be forced to confess", they thought, "how can I hope to resist?" However, on the basis of Korean war experience alone, one might predict that attempts to elicit confessions would persist for 12 weeks or more in less than 50 per cent of the cases, and for 24 weeks or more in only about 15 per cent of the cases.

The experiences of Air Force prisoners of war in Korea who were pressured for false confessions enabled Biderman to compile an outline of the methods that were used to elicit compliance from them.

### Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>VARIANTS</th>
<th>EFFECTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. DEMONSTRATING &quot;OMNIPOTENCE&quot; &amp; &quot;OMNISCIENCE&quot;</td>
<td>Confrontations. Pretending to take cooperation for granted. Demonstrating complete control over victim's fate. Tantalizing with possible favors.</td>
<td>Suggests futility of resistance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table II shows a modified version of this outline. In studying this outline it should be kept in mind that it is still unclear whether these methods were undertaken knowingly to produce the precise effects described. The methods turned out to be not very different from those reported by persons held by Communists of other nations or in the management of ground forces personnel and civilian captives of the Communist Chinese. In this regard, the reports by Hinkle and Wolff, Lifton, and Schein are particularly instructive.

In reviewing the individual accounts of the men who were subjected to systematic attempts by the Communists to extort false confessions, it becomes clear that there was no such thing as 100 per cent compliance or 100 per cent effective resistance. There are many examples of individual ingenuity, courage, and even heroism. In spite of debility, dependency, and dread; in spite of many threats against the prisoner’s life; in spite of threats of reprisals against other prisoners and against the prisoner’s own family through “Communist underground forces in the U.S.”; in spite of dozens of tailor-made rationalizations; in spite of fears of deformity or chronic pain from untreated medical and surgical conditions; in spite of isolation and sleeplessness and deprivation and torture of many kinds; in spite of all the maneuvers of a wily and determined captor, every prisoner was able to draw upon sufficient inner resources to exercise a certain amount of resistance for a certain period of time.

Repatriates have often been called upon to explain why they complied with the enemy’s demands to the degree that they did. Why did they resist the enemy’s demands to the degree that they did? A list of reasons for resistance has been compiled (in large part from spontaneous references in interviews). The list includes the following factors:

1) Moral and duty obligations;
2) Altruistic calculations in terms of national interest and the interest of fellow prisoners;
3) Self-interested calculations in terms of fear of “getting in deeper and deeper”, and in terms of fear of official punishment sooner or later for collaborating;
4) Social pressures in terms of the relationships with other prisoners and fear of reprisals from them;
5) Emotional considerations, including feelings of pride, dignity, and self-respect; hatred of the enemy, of Communism, or of the specific individual making the demands; and a sense of outrage or righteous indignation that sometimes was the last remaining potent factor enabling a man to resist his tormentors.

There were additional important conscious and unconscious factors at work that can be understood only in terms of individual cases.

Some degree of cooperation was universal, since some degree of communication (and hence collaboration) was necessary to obtain any need or satisfaction. For example, prisoners felt that they would have to say something favorable in order to get a letter out. Everyone who did so in effect wrote and signed a propaganda statement available for use by the enemy. Furthermore, once a letter had been written there was apt to seem nothing wrong with making a recording saying the same thing. Then the Communists might suggest that it would be better to substitute for the term “Commies” the term “Chinese People’s Volunteers”, since that was their official name. Even if a man had put nothing at all into the body of his letter that might be useful as propaganda, his address itself was a propaganda slogan, i.e., “care of the Chinese People’s Committee for World Peace”. It was to that address that every parent and loved one of an American prisoner was required to send mail.

TABLE III
RESPONSES TO DEMANDS FOR FALSE CONFESSIONS:
RESISTANCE AND COMPLIANCE*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPLETE RESISTANCE</th>
<th>DEFENSIVE RESISTANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refuses to cooperate in interrogation.</td>
<td>Makes simple denial of accusation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuses to engage in any discussion with interrogator.</td>
<td>Denies that captor has moral or factual basis for making accusation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuses to affirm or deny accusations or respond to implicit accusations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridicules accusations; refuses to discuss them seriously.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responds with indignation to accusations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*After Biderman.
TABLE III (Continued)

Makes statements and deposition to prove innocence.

Makes statement that suspicion was reasonable, “investigation” fair and justified, but protests innocence.

DEFENSIVE COMPLIANCE

Makes statement of possibility that “crime” was unwittingly committed.

Makes statement of “objective guilt”; i.e., that results were “criminal” irrespective of the motives.

Makes ambiguous statements, containing no explicit admissions, but which constitutes a “confession” by implication.

Agrees to comply, but fails to carry through; e.g., writes “confession,” but refuses to sign it.

Makes obviously unacceptable “sabotaged” confession; i.e., makes deposition with obvious inconsistencies, contradictions, or indications that it was obtained through coercion.

Accuses associates, but maintains own innocence.

Makes incomplete “confession,” i.e., makes admission of acts without supporting details required to make “confession” convincing and without expressions of “repentence,” makes statement rationalized as “harmless.”

Makes “compromises” deposition; bargains with interrogator for acceptance of “confession” of lesser crime, or for altering details of deposition to make it less offensive.

Alternately “confesses” or retracts.

Completes “acceptable confession,” but refuses further cooperation; e.g., refuses to implicate others, to make recordings, films, or elaborations of “confession.”

ACTIVE COMPLIANCE

“Confesses” to “criminal tendencies”; i.e., makes statement that his attitude was as criminal as if he had actually committed alleged crime.

Makes “subtly sabotaged” “confession”; i.e., incorporates veiled communications to others, but without making “confession” unacceptable to interrogator.

Completely cooperates in all explicit demands associated with theme of “confession”; pretends to accept guilt.

Strives to please captor; to anticipate demands; pretends repentance.

COMPLETE COMPLIANCE

Accepts “objective truth” of “guilt”; shows involuntary symptoms of remorse.

Accepts “guilt” as literally true.

Makes behavioral choices indicative of complete identification with and commitment to captor.

Table No. III indicates some varieties of behavior formulated to comprise a range of activity from complete resistance to complete compliance. Of the Air Force cases, behaviors at the extreme of compliance did not occur. At the other extreme, behaviors of complete resistance occurred only briefly and during the first stages of pressure or when the coercive attempts were unusually brief, unskilled, or prematurely terminated. In all cases where persistent and intensive efforts to extort “confessions” were made by the Communists, final outcomes were distributed through the range of intermediate possibilities. The breadth of this range is indicated by the variety of behaviors listed in Table III.

Among the Air Force prisoners pressured for false confessions in North Korea and in Communist China, there were cases of incredible fortitude and attachment to principle in the face of overwhelming pressure. There were also a few cases of surprising inability to withstand coercion. Depending upon how one chooses to draw the line, it is possible to say truthfully that all personnel resisted, or that all complied, for the behavior of every man involved at some point a mixture of compliance and resistance. We think it is fair to say that in most cases, including those who signed confessions, resistance was the dominant ingredient.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the experiences of the Air Force prisoners were somewhat divergent from those of the Army prisoners. The Air Force captives were singled out for more intensive pressures and attempts at exploitation of individuals. They were much more frequently in solitary confinement and spent long periods under intensive interrogation. Air Force prisoners were generally in some form of isolation. This varied from complete solitary confinement, in which the prisoner saw nobody at all for long periods, to a less intensive extreme of isolation in which there was limited contact with other people. But most of the prisoners who were exploited in the centrally-directed bacteriological warfare propaganda campaign never saw an organized camp.

For these reasons, as well as others, it is not possible to conduct a meaningful statistical comparison of the behavior of 235 Air Force prisoners with the behavior of the much larger group of more than 4,000 Army prisoners. For example, there were some 13 “educational” courses that were taught to Americans in the large POW camps. Relatively few Air Force prisoners were subjected to these compulsory group indoctrination sessions. There
were some voluntarily organized indoctrination groups among POWs subsequently classified as collaborators or “progressives”. As far as we know, there were no Air Force personnel in such groups. The Air Force prisoners were almost automatically considered “reactionaries” and treated accordingly.

None of the airmen who eventually signed confessions, and who even thereafter gave lectures on BW, appeared sincerely to accept the status of a teacher of Communism or of a reformed criminal. The behavior of these airmen can best be understood as that of individuals who, having finally submitted to pressure to comply, attempted to maintain a status which appeared to be consistent with survival and for which it was possible to muster up rationalizations.

None of the 235 Air Force men who were returned by the Chinese Communists have been tried by courts-martial. A number met a board of inquiry; ten of these subsequently resigned or were separated under honorable conditions. This has been the subject of considerable discussion, inasmuch as the Army prepared at least 54 cases for courts-martial, more than 14 of which have already been presented, with 9 convictions to date. In this regard, I think it is fair to say that none of the captured airmen were “progressives” in the same sense that certain groups of other captives were. But these other captives were subjected to group pressures, which were in some ways different from the pressures exerted on the Air Force personnel. Thus some of the Army POWs appeared to give active cooperation to the enemy without being severely pressured to do so, a circumstance which is not too surprising in view of the size and unselected nature of the group as a whole. We know of no Air Force prisoners of war who engaged in voluntary pro-Communist oratorical contests, debating societies, dramatic productions etc. But there is much that remains to be understood about such behavior before a complete interpretation of it can be made, or final blame assigned.

Miller pointed out some fallacies in the arguments of those who feel that blame is easily fixed in the cases of those who have undergone pressures, the effects of which are still not fully understood; I agree with Miller’s conclusion that the relatively non-punitive approach by the Air Force toward those who signed false confessions is, at this stage of our knowledge, completely justified.

Moderator Lilly: Dr. Lawrence Hinkle has recently published a paper with Dr. Harold Wolff on indoctrination. Until quite recently their material has been classified by the Department of Defense. Dr. Hinkle has been invited to discuss the general problems.

Dr. Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr.: I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here and to talk to the group at GAP about a subject of such great interest to all of us. Perhaps my excuse for being here is the fact that during the period from late 1953 until the early part of this year I was what you might call a “coordinator” of a group of some 20 investigators, both within and outside the government, who attempted to bring together the available information on the methods of interrogation and indoctrination that are used by Communist state police. This group was under the direction of Dr. Harold Wolff.

At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to the many selfless and able people who assisted in the gathering of the information upon which our report was based. For security reasons these people must remain anonymous. I cannot tell you too much about our sources, except to say that we did have access to information from sources available to the government; but I can give you some general outlines of these sources. The information about the details of the Communist arrest and interrogation systems and a great deal of the information about the purposes, the attitudes, and the training of those who administer these systems, were obtained from people whom I shall call experts in that area. The knowledge of the prisoner’s reactions to his experiences was obtained by the direct observation of persons recently released from Communist prisons. Some of these observations continued for weeks, or even months, and were supplemented by follow-up observation periods months later. These included, in many cases, complete physical, neurological and psychiatric examinations, and psychological testing, as well as the testimony of friends, family, associates, and the like.

Among those who were studied intensively were military and civilian prisoners of diverse ranks and backgrounds, women as well as men, defectors, resistors, persons who were allegedly “brainwashed” and “not brainwashed”, some people who admittedly cooperated with their captors and some who said they did not.

In supplementing this we made extensive use of the excellent information gathered by the United States Army and the United

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States Air Force, some of which you have heard presented here today, as well as the material assembled for the Defense Advisory Committee on prisoners of war. The very large and, I might say, very illuminating published literature was also drawn upon.

In general, it is our conclusion that the evidence from all of these sources is quite consistent, and that it provides a basis for confidence in the statements which we have made.

I want to give special credit to some of the men whose work you have heard presented here today. I think they have added significantly to our knowledge in an area where we constantly need more knowledge.

I cannot go into all of the things that we might say about our own work, but I do believe that the time has come when some conclusions can be generally accepted. The first of these is that the methods of the Russian and satellite state police are derived from age-old police methods, many of which were known to the Czarist Okhrana, and to its sister organizations in other countries.

DIAGRAM 1
BACKGROUND OF COMMUNIST METHODS

15th CENTURY
BYZANTINE HERITAGE
1. Unrestricted Autocracy
2. Internal intrigue and espionage

16th CENTURY
1. Permanent body of private retainers responsible only to Czar
2. Central control of all aspects of the state
3. Purges

17th-18th CENTURY
Central Directorate with mission to guard the internal security of the state

19th CENTURY
Most highly organized, effective and powerful secret police of any European state
1. Sudden arrest
2. Dossier
3. Repetitive interrogation
4. Isolation technique developed


20th CENTURY
CHEKA
1. Highly organized and refined methods
2. Communist ideology and logic
3. Abandonment of direct brutality
4. Development of persuasion techniques; exploitation of intimate interrogator-prisoner relationship

OGPU—NKVD—MVD (KGB)
1. Purges
2. Public trials
3. POW indoctrination (exposure to nothing but communist interpretation of history and current events)

CHINESE SYSTEM
1. Group pressures
2. Self and group criticism (Applied to non-party personnel and to prisoners)
3. Prisoner indoctrination
   Rote learning
   Autobiography and diary writing

During the 20th Century, first the Cheka, then the OGPU, NKVD, MVD, and now the KGB have systematized these methods. Nevertheless, they remain police methods. They are not dependent upon drugs, hypnotism or any other special procedure designed by scientists. No scientists took part in their design; nor do scientists take part in their operation. I confess to you that establishing a negative conclusion of this nature is difficult. I can only tell you that we have critically reviewed all of the information that we could get our hands on, and this is our conclusion.
### Diagram 3

**A Typical Time Table**

**Eastern European Secret Police Systems (Communist)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weeks</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Reaction of prisoner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1. Suspicion</td>
<td>P Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2. Accumulation of evidence</td>
<td>R Suspense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>O Awareness of being avoided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Reports of informers</td>
<td>G Feelings of unfocused guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>R Fear and uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>E Bewilderment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rigid regimen</td>
<td>S Hyperactivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Increasing pressure</td>
<td>I Increasing depression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Int. R.O.C.</td>
<td>V Fatigue (pain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Deposition</td>
<td>E Humiliation, loss of self esteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Respite</td>
<td>D Great need to talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Trial “confession”</td>
<td>S Utter dependence on anyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The essential feature of these methods is isolation and repetitive interrogation, the use of much personal history material; all of this carried out in an atmosphere productive of fatigue, sleep loss, and the various forms of physiological disturbance which can be produced by hunger, cold, unusual positions and the like. Prominent features of the reactions of the prisoner are anxiety, uncertainty, and intolerable discomfort. If this regimen is carried forward long enough it usually leads to mental dulling, confusion, loss of discrimination and despondency, associated with an intense desire to escape from the situation; and the ultimate result of this type of pressure is a state of delirium, associated with hallucinatory and delusional experiences. In this setting a “protocol” (or “confes-

In the period from 1936 onward, while the Chinese Communists were in Northwest China, they had the advantage of contact with the Russian Communists. It is quite evident that the information and experience of the Russians was transmitted to the Chinese Communists during this time.

In the development of their state police methods the Chinese Communists have also drawn upon the experience of the Russian state police, and indeed have been instructed by them. One finds occasional instances, especially in the dealing with prisoners of importance, in which the Russian methods and the Chinese methods are very much the same.
**DIAGRAM 4**

**A TYPICAL TIME TABLE**

**CHINESE COMMUNIST SECRET POLICE SYSTEM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weeks</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Reaction of prisoners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1. Suspicion</td>
<td>Anxiety and suspense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2. Preparation for arrest:</td>
<td>Awareness of being avoided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demuciation by neighbors and associates covertly and at local group criticism sessions. Restrictions and annoyance by police.</td>
<td>Feelings of unfocused guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3. Scares under dramatic circumstances (Initial interrogation by 3 “judges”:</td>
<td>Fear, complete uncertainty as to fate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>±17</td>
<td>4. House arrest</td>
<td>Reaction like that of KGB prisoner, leaving subject feeling defeated, humiliated, mentally dull, pliable and with great need for talk and approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>±20</td>
<td>5. Sudden transfer to detention prison Isolation resembling KGB procedures</td>
<td>Emotional nakedness, unfocused feelings of guilt and unworthiness, helpless, degraded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Transfer to group cell</td>
<td>Increasing dejection, fatigue, sleep loss, pain, hunger, weight loss, mental dulling, confusion (occasional delirium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>Increasing difficulty in discriminating between this material and that from earlier memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reviled</td>
<td>Attempts at self justification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humiliated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bratled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public self- and group criticism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diary and autobiography writing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DIAGRAM 5**

**A TYPICAL TIME TABLE**

**CHINESE COMMUNIST SECRET POLICE SYSTEM**

| 24 | 7. Preparation of “confession” |
|    | (Some fellow prisoners sincerely helpful) |
|    | Some respite from pressures |
|    | Hopeful, rationalizes, thankful for kindness and help and may acknowledge apparent dedication and idealism of his “teachers”. |

| 30 | 8. Rejection of “confession” by interrogator |
|    | Hopes dashed. |

| 90  | 9. Resumption of pressures in group cell |
|     | Alternating helpfulness, frustration and degradation |

| 100 | 10. Preparation of new “confession” |
|     | 11. Rejection of new “confession” |
|     | 12. Final achievement of “proper” attitude and acceptable “confession” |
|     | By rationalization, and tentative partial belief is able to conform and obtain group acceptance and approval |

| 130 | Group acceptance and approval |
|     | Profound relief |

| 140 | 13. Continued study and discussion of Communist materials |
|     | 14. “Trial” and “confession” |
|     | Gradual readjustment of attitudes and behavior to the new reality situation. |
| 150 | 15. Release, or punishment |

| 200 | |
| 250 | |
However, in general it can be said that there are some significant differences between what the Chinese do and what the Russians do. The KGB, which is the present designation for the Russian state police, has as the goal of its procedure the production of a satisfactory protocol on which a so-called "trial" can be based. The Chinese have as an additional goal the production of long lasting changes in the basic attitudes and behavior of the prisoner. The Chinese use isolation, but it is not a necessary part of their handling of prisoners. More characteristically they make intensive use of group interaction; they put much greater dependence on the disorganization produced by the effects of doubt, rejection and hostility by a group, and by complete lack of privacy. They use public self-criticism and group criticism which, as Dr. Lilton has correctly pointed out, is derived from a Communist party practice that antedates the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The Chinese use self-criticism and group criticism as means of indoctrinating non-party persons, prisoners and the general population itself. The adaptation is Chinese, and a very effective one. The Chinese also use diary writing and rote learning, and they may greatly prolong the detention period.

There are some things that can be said to our comfort about all of these methods. First of all, none of them produce any detectable changes in brain function other than those secondary to organic brain damage. Secondly, they produce only variable changes in attitudes and behavior in those people who have been held in prison or other controlled environments and then released. These changes are not predictable in terms of the methods used; but, as Dr. West has accurately pointed out, and Dr. Schein also, the results are dependent upon many factors having to do with the personality, the character structure, and the immediate situation of the prisoner, as well as what was done to him. Change in attitudes and behavior produced by these methods are usually of much smaller degree than is generally supposed. In our experience they are relatively transient. After a period that can be measured in months the former prisoner tends to revert to attitudes roughly similar to those that he held prior to his imprisonment. Finally, these changes are, I think, entirely comprehensible as an aftermath of the experiences that the prisoner went through.

I believe it is safe to say that we know the methods that are used, and that neither we, nor those who use these methods, understand entirely why men behave as they do when exposed to them. This is the question before us at the present time.

Moderator Lilly: Thank you, Dr. Hinkle.

In the sense that George Orwell wrote a handbook for brainwashing I believe that the literature that is coming out at the present time, including that which we have heard here today, can be said to be a handbook on what brainwashing is rather than on what one fantasies it can be. I hope that this material does not help those who use the methods to sharpen their technique to make them more effective. We hope instead it will bring worldwide discredit on any one who uses such methods.

Dr. Wedge would like to open the general discussion.

Dr. Bryant Wedge: I would like to congratulate the excellent panel for their sound discussion of this subject. One aspect of the subject which seems important in our planning but which was not discussed is the problem of means of defense against totalitarian indoctrination. I would like to summarize briefly some views about means of resistance derived from experience with repatriated POWs.

The experience is this: for ten days I spent the waking hours with the twenty-three repatriated POWs who had been exchanged in Operation Little Switch and who had been immediately transferred to Valley Forge Army Hospital as being the most thoroughly indoctrinated repatriates. At that time I was myself a patient which permitted a closeness of observation not otherwise possible. In subsequent months I was able to compare them with thirty other repatriates who had more or less successfully resisted indoctrination. While I certainly agree with much that has been said today about the nature of those individuals more subject to indoctrination than others (especially in regard to social isolation), I would particularly like to mention the issue of psychological means of defense against indoctrination of prisoners.

The process of indoctrination depends heavily upon the captors being able to convey an impression of omnipotent control. Hence the prisoner who is able to maintain a secret, internal, private sense of psychological superiority to his captors is immensely armored from indoctrination. Such a private sense of psychological superiority depends on the fact that every prisoner has unique knowledge and unique experience which is not shared by his captors. Particularly if the prisoner is in a group of other prisoners,
he is able to develop methods of communication which exclude the captors and demonstrate their fallibility.

Some of the devices which were developed spontaneously in the Korean POW situation proved quite effective in maintaining the sense of personal identity which accompanies demonstrations of private secrets and undermines the myth of the captor’s omnipotence. For example, many groups developed special code words which appeared complimentary to the guards, but meant to the prisoners that the captors were very nasty people. Often they misled their guards by teaching them American games with absurd twists of the rules and methods of play and would delight in the deception. At some points the prisoners took advantage of the rules under which they learned the captors operated to show some modest control of the situation. For example, when they discovered that the Chinese guards were forbidden direct physical punishment, some of the prisoners developed techniques of perpetrating petty annoyances which drove the guards to impatient fury from which the prisoners got tremendous teasing pleasure.

While the catalogue of devices for maintaining inner superiority could be greatly extended, I will mention only one other important means. This is the means of misleading by giving inexact information. So long as the POW feels relatively in charge of the kind of information which he reveals he is relatively protected from the serious effects of failure to maintain inner control. Unfortunately, the Military Service Code of Conduct for Prisoners of War instructs him to give only his name, rank and serial number so long as he is able to resist. This rule is almost impossible to maintain for any length of time under the conditions of captivity imposed in Korea. This rule deprives the prisoner of his ability to keep inner secrets or to mislead the enemy, no matter how slightly. While it is almost always possible to force a man to talk, it is much less easy to evaluate what he says, and knowledge of this fact may be greatly supportive to maintaining the private sense of superiority which enables a prisoner to resist indoctrination.

I feel, with Dr. James Miller, that this particular section of the Code of Conduct should be reviewed and altered in view of the kind of facts which have been brought out here today.

Dr. James C. Miller: I have found in talking to a number of my colleagues in the psychiatric profession that they have not been generally aware of the policy developments in our country relating to this problem of “brainwashing”. Dr. Hinkle and Dr. Wolff and others whom you have seen, have testified before the Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War of the Department of Defense, attempting to aid that committee to resolve differences among the Armed Forces, differences with which our GAP Committee in cooperation with Government (Federal) Agencies or perhaps the Committee on Social Issues might well concern themselves.

The Air Force and Admiral Dan Gallery of the Navy took one position; the rest of the Navy and the Army took the other. The Army and Navy won out over the Air Force, and in August, 1955, President Eisenhower signed an executive order establishing the new code for prisoners of war which essentially forbids them from talking freely and directs them to use their moral stamina and patriotic force to withstand the various forms of brainwashing to which they may be submitted. We cannot discuss this at any length now. It is a complex and subtle issue but it is a matter with which GAP might be concerned. It has seemed to me—and I have had no direct association with it myself—that the representatives of our profession, including Dr. Hinkle and others, agreed more or less in testifying before the Advisory Committee that every man does have his breaking point. The report that was written to the Secretary of Defense was a highly literate and informed document which made obeisance to this viewpoint and then completely contradicted it in the final decision, accepting rather the traditional views held by Marine generals that moral strength can enable servicemen to resist any sort of brainwashing and similar views advocated by religious persons who testified before the Committee.

I think it is important to consider this as an issue in psychiatry, recognizing a potential future which may be decades off but which nevertheless is foreshadowed by developments like the work of Dr. Lilly1 and Dr. Hebb2 and others on sensory deprivation, work on psychopharmaceuticals which we now have and others which are undoubtedly to come, and work on electrical stimulation of the brain.

As Dr. Hinkle has said, these methods so far as we know have not yet been applied, at least extensively, in brainwashing. When

they will first begin to use them we do not know. It is quite possible, and frightening, that in some period not too far off some of these methods may be employed. (I am continuously using phrases to limit the potential meaning of this because it can be harmfully and unjustifiably magnified in the popular mind.) If so, the question of whether the military can order one of our prisoners of war to withstand these influences must be faced in the same way that we may ask whether it is legitimate for an officer to order a GI to stand at attention under the influence of ether.

There are complex moral issues which I think personally — and I suspect many of my psychiatric colleagues would agree — are best represented by the Air Force point of view, which at the moment is the minority viewpoint in the Department of Defense and does not represent the official policy of our country.

**Moderator Lilly:** Dr. West wishes to reply to Dr. Miller’s question.

**Dr. West:** I would like to say one thing for the edification of this group in regard to the Code of Conduct. This is not intended in any way to support “Air Force arguments” against the views of any other group. In the military services the Code is now established — the decision about it has been made by the President — and unless the Code is modified all branches of the service will abide by it.

I am sure that most of you have seen the Code. It says: “1) I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense. 2) I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist. 3) If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy. 4) If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or (sic) take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way. 5) When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause. 6) I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.”

You will note that the words “to the utmost of my ability” suggest that there are possible limits to the individual’s capacity to resist indefinitely. Rather than to specify the total failure of resistance once the “name, rank and serial number” line has been breached, it seems to me that wise training procedures, (such as those used at the Air Force’s Survival School) should emphasize the importance of continuing resistance — to the utmost of one’s ability — no matter what concessions have been yielded as a result of force and coercion. This makes it possible for the prisoner to resist in depth rather than along a certain line rigidly prescribed. He should know many evasions and tricks, ways to outwit the enemy, techniques for maintaining his own integrity. The person who may become a prisoner should be prepared in such a way as to help him to sustain his ego in the face of the kind of assault to which we now realize a captive of the Communists may be subjected, particularly in the case of an Air Force prisoner. Our training procedures should be continually improved to teach every man how to survive with honor.

**Moderator Lilly:** Thank you Dr. West. Training for raising one’s threshold against these procedures is extremely important; selection procedures may also be of great value in the light of finding the resisting groups.

**Dr. Goldfarb:** Because of the resemblance of some of these processes to what are generally regarded as psychotherapeutic processes, I wonder if the panel could tell us whether those who attempted to comply or resist, those who fell in one of the two extreme groups, had one or many interrogators successively and also whether there was any haphazard or planned attempt on the basis of the interrogation squads to establish relationships between the interrogated and the particular interrogators.

**Moderator Lilly:** Dr. Hinkle, would you like to comment?

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Dr. Hinkle: I find it very difficult to give any systematic statement about people who did or did not resist. If you study an individual case you can usually comprehend why he did what he did on the basis of the type of man he was, the situation he was in, and what was happening to him at the time; but you cannot divide men into “compliers” or “resisters” simply upon the basis of the methods used upon them. As a matter of fact, I doubt that you could really make too rigid a division on the basis of any one special personality characteristic either — this in spite of the fact, as Dr. Schein has shown us, there are certain discernible trends.

But you can say that among both those who resisted and those who cooperated have been people who have had one interrogator and those who have had several; and any one of a great number of things may have been done to them.

I would like to say a word about this business of a breaking point for every man. I think we all recognize the physiologic fact that by relatively simple means any man can be brought to a state of confusion, mental dulling, and lack of discrimination during which he can be made to comply with some demands of those who have him in their hands. In this sense, of course, every man has his breaking point. Yet even under these circumstances his compliance may be very limited, and not extend beyond the immediate situation. This is a far different matter from active collaboration in the absence of coercion, and is fairly readily distinguished from it. I would also say that most people — even the vast majority — can escape without active collaboration carried to a high degree.

I believe there is an awareness of the complexity of this among those who are concerned with the administration of the Code. I think that there will be a tendency to look upon the Code as an ideal to be attained. When persons are unable to live up to the Code, the circumstances will have to be considered.
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry

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2. To re-evaluate old concepts and to develop and test new ones;
3. To apply the knowledge thus obtained for the promotion of mental health and good human relations.

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