INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT IN FAMILY BEHAVIOR
Formulated by
The Committee on the Family* of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry

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INTRODUCTION

More than three years ago the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry decided that "the family" had been on the borderline of psychiatric interest long enough, and that it was time to bring this area into a specific psychiatric focus. It appointed a Committee to review the field and to make a report which would organize the data in such a way as to be useful to psychiatrists and possibly to those in other, related professions. Because the report employs concepts not often encountered in psychiatric communications, it may sound somewhat strange to an audience of psychiatrists. To show why these concepts were needed and to illustrate the logic of their use, this introduction describes the steps by which we arrived at them.

It was quite clear at the outset that "the family" represented a highly charged, if rather nebulous, object of interest on the part of numerous groups in the national community. A year before the Committee was called into existence, there had been held in Washington, D. C., under the auspices of the White House, a National Conference on Family Life. The National Council on Family Relations had been in existence for a number of years. It published a Journal and held annual meetings in which both the theory of family dynamics and the practical aspects of guidance and counselling of individuals in family difficulties were considered.

Further evidence for the extensive concern with family affairs lay in the large number of family and child welfare agencies scattered throughout the communities of the nation. Educators and the lay public pooled their common interest in family life in such organizations as the Parent-Teachers Association. Disparate groups like the clergy, politicians, market researchers and public opinion analysts all had opinions or methods for arriving at opinions regarding what takes place or what should take place in American family life. The media of mass communications revealed a heavy weighting in the family area. Many books were published annually related specifically to family problems, and the press, radio, motion picture, and magazine fields were heavily loaded on the domestic and family side. At more theoretical levels sociology, anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis all utilized a theory of the family in some aspect of their particular approaches to human behavior. In short, it appeared as no surprise that the United States is a family-minded nation, and that practically every visible group had some kind of stake in the family area.

In consideration of this extensive, but unfocused activity, the Committee asked itself what it could contribute to an understanding of family behavior as a psychiatric organization. With this tentative idea in mind, we arrived at the following hypothetical question: Is it possible to make any generalizations regarding processes within the American family which affect the mental health or illness of the various members of the family?

On the one hand, this seemed a rather ambitious goal. On the other hand, it did conform with many insights derived from the social sciences in general and psychoanalysis in particular. Based on the study of individual cases of mental illness, a fairly extensive agreement had been reached that difficulties in adjustment of the individual were derived from harmful experiences during early development. The aim was also in conformity with the basic assumptions of much of the practical activity already directed at the family by social workers, family and marriage counsellors, pastoral counsellors, and "advice givers" in general.

The difficulty at the outset was how to derive data and materials based not on the study of sick or well individuals, but on the study of family processes. It is easy enough to study individuals against a family background in which the dynamic principles are never clearly specified. The influence of the father, or the mother, or the siblings on the individual being examined can be studied without having to consider the totality of the relationships among each other. To change the object of inquiry from the individual to the family, however, means the employment of different methods of observation and of different conceptual tools. Seen from an altered perspective, it becomes apparent that the family is a fairly well-defined, organized entity with a life history and dynamic principles of its own. Because of these considerations, we found ourselves faced with a new problem. We had set ourselves the job of finding out something about the normal and pathological physiology of the family, so to speak, without knowing anything about its anatomy. It seemed fruitless to acquire extensive observational data without undertaking this fundamental step in self-education.

Thus, we decided that the first concrete step towards our goal would be to inform ourselves regard-
ing the structure and function of the family. But this apparently simple task brought us face to face with a whole new series of complications. Instead of finding a clear-cut definition of the family easy to achieve, we discovered that families exhibited the most astonishing variance in their structure and function. If one examined only variance dependent upon ethnic, class, and regional difference in the United States and excluded the variance found in other societies, the range was quite remarkable. It was found that differences in lateral extension (the range of collateral relatives such as aunts, uncles, and cousins) and in vertical extension (the range of generations such as grandparents, great-grandparents, and grandparents) made it difficult to know where to locate the boundary of "The Family."

In seeking for factors to correlate with this variation in lateral and vertical extension, we found that the structure of the family was inextricably associated with the structure of the society of which it was a part. Small family groups were associated with the urban middle class and its continuous demand for maximum mobility, both geographical and social. Continuity of generations was found in the upper class families with their family portraits, traditions, and hierarchical systems. Collateral relatives proved important in rural areas and in certain ethnic groups. In brief, it turned out that the family could not be identified as a structural unit except with reference to the surrounding social system.

This aspect of the complexities involved in a study of family dynamics became even more prominent when we considered the topic of the functions of the family. Not only were various and differing functions assigned to the family in different social milieu, but even those functions which were apparently universal, such as the socialization of children, the satisfaction of sexual needs, or the biological and material maintenance of the members of the family, were carried out in such various ways with such differing implications that it proved impossible to obtain meaningful patterns without reference to the surrounding social system. The responsibilities and attitudes of a father toward his child, his wife, and his mother-in-law could not be divorced from his other roles in the society in which he lived. For example, it was possible for him to perform differently, and somewhat different functions were expected of him depending on what his occupational role was—whether he owned a farm, worked in a factory, or piloted an airplane. A mother's attitude toward and relations with her children varied, among other factors, with her ethnic origin as well as with her decision to stay at home or to increase the family income by going to work.

Since it was obvious that no generalizations regarding the structure and function of the family could be obtained apart from an understanding of the particular social structure with which it was integrated, a new dimension was added. The job of self-education was broadened by the need to become familiar with contemporary concepts and fundamental assumptions involved in the understanding of social systems. The structure of a social system, however, especially a system as broad and complex in development and in current function as that of the United States, proved to contain as much variance as can be found in families and in individual personalities. Pursuing our task, we discovered that the similarities and variations in our social patterns were related to a fourth level of human behavior—the variations in values of a culture and subcultures. These values are reflected in the social system. For instance, the significance and structure of our occupational system only became clear when considered in the light of the tremendous value we place on planning for the future, on personal achievement based on hard work, and on individual initiative. Relations between parents and children, in our own country, frequently reflect a belief in the potential for goodness, dignity, and worth of the individual. There was no escaping from the ubiquitous and penetrating effect of cultural value orientations on every aspect of human behavior. We had no choice, especially in view of the confused and confused nature of our cultural heritage, but to add this area to our stock of information, and to try to integrate ourselves with the conceptual tools necessary to an understanding of this field, so far from our home base in psychiatry.

The process of self-education necessitated by the ramifications of the inquiry had an advantage beyond that of extending the individual horizons of the members of the Committee. It focused attention upon a way of viewing human behavior which is not easily perceived in the context of purely clinical work with emotionally disturbed individuals. In clinical work one tends to study the distortions of a reality known to the observer and the maladapted behavior based on such distortions in psychologically disturbed individuals. The field of observation is intra-personal and inter-personal in the sense of a series of small two or three person clusters composing the social relations of the patient, including the relation with the therapist. In this setting, fairly satisfactory explanations of human behavior can be derived from conceptions based upon purely intra-psychic mechanisms, such as those of integration, defense, and reaction formation. As soon as the area of observation is widened, however, to include larger human groups such as the family, the environment as a given constant disappears. In its place there emerges a field of transaction which is not intuitively known or easily discoverable by the observer, especially insofar as the observer is a part of the field. The structure of the field at any given moment is dependent upon components contributed by: 1) the physical universe, 2) the biological situation of the individuals transacting within the field, 3) the intra-psychic status of these individuals, 4) the small groups formed by these transacting individuals, 5) the extended social system, and 6) the system of values existing at that time and in that place. The extensiveness of this field of transaction, and the variety and intricacy of the network of interlocking systems of which it is composed, constitutes a cognitive problem for the observer. The attention falters in trying to span so large an area, and common sense and intuition fail to supply adequate and easily summoned cues for a "definition of the situation."

As psychiatrists, we lack gestalten for perceiving phenomena of such magnitude and complexity. We
have to construct conceptual patterns for ourselves which can encompass the field of transaction as the necessary background requisite to a complete description of human behavior. This means that we must add to our already existing stock of concepts related to physical, chemical, biological, and psychological events, a new cluster of concepts, of equal scientific rigor and seriousness, related to the group-dynamic, sociological and cultural-anthropological descriptions of events. Such an aim would go further than what is usually meant by the term "inter-disciplinary" or "multi-professional." The aim requires that the concepts basic to other disciplines must really be integrated so that they become a part of the psychiatrist's cognitive orientation toward reality—or at least as much so as physical, chemical, and biological concepts are at present.

It is in consideration of this view, that we determined the form of the present report. We decided that the report should begin with the description of methods for analyzing social structure and the family as a sub-system of the social system. The structure and function of the family will then be presented in its most abstract and universal terms. We will then take up the analysis of the system of cultural value orientations and then apply this to the description of the dominant American family patterns. This will conclude the present report.

We think the significance of this report lies partly in its concrete content, but equally, if not more, in its point of view, and in its application of a method. We may easily fail to present both the point of view and the method with sufficient clarity and cogency. We are treading on unfamiliar ground, and opportunities for stumbling are plentiful. Because of all these considerations, the length of this presentation is much greater than is usual for GAP reports. Yet, with all its length, this report is merely preliminary. It does not achieve our announced purpose: to be able to describe in detail the processes within families responsible for the mental health or illness of its members. In analyzing integration and mal-integration in the family and in setting forth some of the patterns characteristic of the American family, we hope to present a method whereby these processes may be detected and characterized. Their detailed description and analysis will be taken up in subsequent reports.

I

Points of Reference for the Analysis of Family Processes

Our purpose is to analyze family life with reference to the processes responsible for the mental health or illness of its individual members. For this it is necessary to develop a system of operational concepts. "The Family" must be defined. Since we have all lived in families, it is easy to assume that we know what we mean by the word. Yet, as with many other common sense notions, rule-of-thumb definitions are likely to exhibit so much variation as to be practically useless for analytical purposes. Furthermore, insofar as the family is associated with the mental health of the individual, then it can be safely assumed that there are some states or conditions within the family that favor good or bad health. We need to develop concepts to detect and describe such states. Lastly, not all families are the same. If we compare them even within the same country or city, we find the most bewildering variety. How to distinguish the normal—dominant or variant—from the pathological or deviant states conducive to illness is a primary task.

To work with many concepts new to psychiatrists, we need a frame of reference within which to locate them. This can be constructed from a set of points of reference which will here be only briefly sketched.

1. The family is a collection of individuals. One point of reference, therefore, is the individual, including everything we know about his somatic and psychological functions.

2. The family, however, is not simply a collection but rather an organization, a group. Another point of reference, therefore, is the small primary group, with its characteristic action processes and group dynamics.

3. The family is in addition always a major unit of the total social system. As such, it has structural and functional characteristics which ramify throughout the whole social system in a network of articulation with other sub-systems such as the occupational and educational systems. Thus, a third point of reference is the social system.

4. The family is also an agency for the transmission of cultural values. Furthermore, its very form and function are intimately connected with the specific value orientations of a given culture. Accordingly, a fourth point of reference is the system of values characteristic of the social system in question.

5. Finally, a family exists in a particular locale, or territory—a spot on the map. For example, the contrasts between a rural and urban environmental setting may be of considerable significance for variance in family structure and function. The geographical setting is thus a fifth point of reference.

These five reference points provide a convenient descriptive conceptual frame, making it easy to identify the point of view from which the family is being considered. It is a part of our thesis, however, that they can be considered as more than simple reference points. They can be viewed as a system of inter-related and more or less integrated component parts. When looked at this way, the individual, the group, the social system, the cultural values, and the geographical location are all foci of organization in one integrated system or field of transaction.

Thus, a married woman may or may not be a mother. Whether she is or not probably will depend on her biological and psychological state. But if she is a mother, her parental attitudes will vary according to her geographical location and status in the social system; she will have different techniques for taking care of her child if she lives on a farm with her husband usually within hailing distance from those she will develop if she lives in a city as the wife of a traveling salesman who is gone for long periods. Not only geographical location and occu-
pational status, but the size of the primary group will produce variations in the parental attitudes and child care arrangements. The farm wife who has ten older children will delegate much more responsibility than the traveling salesman's wife who has two children under five.

In spite of all the differences between these two mothers, they may yet resemble each other in their attitudes toward disciplining and "spoiling" their children. These attitudes will be strongly influenced by the cultural value orientations of the two women. For example, if both mothers derive their values from one of our more severe ethics, it is quite likely that they will consider their offspring basically evil little brutes who need to be severely trained and repeatedly punished in order to be turned into reasonable human beings.

The primary point to be made in this connection is that the foci of organization in the total field do not vary independently of each other. No matter where the focus of observation is directed—whether at the individual housewife, the family as a group, the family within the larger social system, the value of orientation of the individual, family, subgroup, or total social system, or the geographical setting in which events of human behavior occur—all the other foci of organization are always implied. Because they are in a state of transaction and reciprocal influence, they cannot be divorced from one another, and any description of human behavior must take account of the contributions of all these foci of organization.

We intend in this report to confine ourselves to two of these foci, which seem to us to be of the greatest strategic importance. These two are: the social system, and the cultural value orientations. To a lesser extent we shall treat some of the effects of the geographical setting of the family.

II The Relation of the Family to the Social System

Extensive cross-cultural surveys have shown that some form of family is found in every society. There is no known society which has not institutionalized sexual and parental roles in a formal pattern of small nuclear groups integrated with other nuclear groups in an extended kinship system. The patterns vary with respect to size and kinship lines but the basic structure is universal. Furthermore, in all societies the family system is structurally related to all other units of the social system. It is universally integrated with other systems such as residence, or community organization, the stratification system (i.e., the class structure), the occupational system, the educational system, and the religious system of the society. More often than not it is integrated with the power structure or political system of the society.

A familiar set of examples may be cited. Let us examine the relations of the family in our own society with the occupational, social class, and educational systems. In the main the class position of the family in the United States—especially the middle class family—is dependent upon the position held by the father in the occupational world. But it is also true that his job depends upon certain qualifications attained through education and training. Further than this, everyone knows—democratic ideologies notwithstanding—that what education one receives is in large part dependent upon the social and economic status of the family. This is to say that family status, class position, occupational position and educational attainments are all interdependent. However, the smooth functioning of these inter-dependencies in the time axis depends upon the individual and his personal qualities. Let us take the example of the child of the well-established upper-middle class family who lacks the intelligence to obtain the training necessary for any job commensurate with the status of his family. If on this account he loses occupational status, then a strain is likely to develop in his family. It is to be expected that one or another member of the family will object to or at least be unhappy about his more menial job. On the other hand, if ways are found to maintain his occupational status without his demonstrating any ability for the job, then strains of another kind are produced. There is a serious threat to the structure of the whole social system in passing on occupational positions to persons who are not qualified for the jobs.

There is also a universal connection between the family, the rules of residence of the community, and the composition of ethnic groups. The members of a nuclear family group (by which we mean husband, wife, and their children) in almost all societies live together in the same residence. Whatever the physical or architectural nature of the dwelling place may be, it is nevertheless a place—a territorial location. Thus, from the point of view of the individual, it is the family primarily that determines where he lives and what he calls "home," with all the implications for the sense of personal identity that local, regional and national sentiments contribute. From the point of view of the social system the family is thus the basic unit of regional organization of the community, state or nation.

Particularly important for our objective is the structural relation between nuclear and extended family groups, rules of residence, and ethnic groups. The nuclear or primary group, as stated before, consists usually of husband, wife, and their children. A kinship system integrates such nuclear groups both through vertical extension—that is, by continuity of generations in time—and through lateral extension—the collateral relatives of the present generation. The residential patterns of the group or sub-group prescribe what permutations and combinations of nuclear, vertically or laterally extended relatives shall live together. In our American society, for example, especially for urban groups of an industrial community, the prevailing pattern prescribes residential isolation of nuclear families from all relatives, collateral or generational. The husband who has to house and feed his mother-in-law, or the wife called upon to find room for a sister-in-law—to say nothing of more distant cousins, aunts, or grandparents—feels sorely abused, as a general rule. In other societies, however, the sharing of household facilities by a wider assortment of relatives, near and far, is regarded as a natural design for living.

The relation between the family—whatever its
kind—and the system of residence is also structurally integrated with the ethnicity of the community. An ethnic group is in one sense a system of extended and related family groups. Any concept of race based on clear-cut distinctions has now been shown to be invalid in any strict sense, and specific traits are found to be diffused through many different ethnic groups. Nevertheless, it is also true that the members of an ethnic group tend to be more closely related to each other, biologically, than they are to members of other ethnic groups. Thus, the composition of the family is of structural significance to the related ethnic group, and conversely, the ethnic group frequently determines the structure of the family. This reciprocal relation is also integrated with the residential structure of the community. Families that are ethnically related frequently tend—for some generations, at least—to live in the same location: a fact which in crowded urban communities often leads to considerable strain if not outright social conflict.

Clearly, then, the universality of these structural inter-relations would seem to indicate that the family has functions of fundamental importance to the total society. They meet certain requirements which cannot be satisfied in any other way.

Of the many inter-related functions which the family supplies both to the individual and to the social system, two are apparently allocated specifically to the family. The rest are shared to varying degrees by other organizations. The first two functions are reproduction and socialization of the children. The survival of the species requires a mechanism for the constant introduction of new members. The biological processes of humans, which would in themselves, apparently, satisfy this prerequisite, are not intrinsically sufficient. The social organization which supports the species requires for its perpetuation that the new members be recruited in an orderly and systematic fashion. There is no doubt that every society universally ascribes a rank order—a destiny—to its children at the moment of birth through the mechanism of the family. Children cannot be potentially anybody with a perfectly random, anything-is-possible kind of future ahead of them. In order that the structure and function of the social system be maintained, children have to be introduced into it with an ascribed social status—a place to begin, and a range of selection of future goals from out of the myriad possibilities of the total system of roles of the particular society.

This extensive selectivity and ordering of possibilities is accomplished through the legitimization of the parents. It is not the children, actually, who have to be legitimate, but the parents, so that the raising of children within families can be assured to the social system. Thus, the invariant insistence on the legitimacy principle is not primarily for the sake of controlling sexual behavior. In many societies extra-marital and pre-marital sexual intercourse are positively sanctioned. The legitimacy is invoked primarily to preserve and transmit the entire system of status relations and the integrative mechanisms which maintain its structure, by allocating the newcomers to the appropriate status.

The second aspect of the recruitment prerequisite is the socialization of the children once they have arrived and have been legitimately assigned their initial status—whatever it may be. This functional prerequisite is closely associated with an important aspect of the biological focus of organization, namely, the prolonged dependency of the child. The dependency is actually both biological and psychological and stands in a reciprocal relation with another established biological fact: the apparent lack of innate behavior, and the extraordinary plasticity of the human child. Because our children bring so little pre-determined behavior into the world with them, and have so much to acquire, they need a great deal of time to learn how to play their roles in life. By the same token, they can be taught a wide variety of behavior. And since much of it is mutually exclusive, once it has been learned, it cannot easily be unlearned or relearned, or transferred to a different kind of social system. Plasticity diminishes with maturation.

This functional requirement, determined by the prolonged immaturity of the child, is apparently better satisfied by the family system than by any other institutional arrangement—at least to this point in the history of mankind. Efforts have been made to socialize children exclusively in institutions, where the parental roles are shared by a number of different individuals. By and large, these efforts have not been as successful as some form of a family. The very diffuseness and discontinuity of the roles does not permit the child to develop a clear idea of his status and identity. The child's need for a stable and enduring relationship with significant parent figures based on affection (a need which is assumed to be basic) is not well met.

It is within the framework of mutual love and interpersonal security—that is, relations relatively free from anxiety, exploitation, and intimidation—that the child can best learn the social role behavior, and the techniques of adjustment to the situations he will meet as an adult. These roles are learned on the basis of imitation and identification. Assuming that the family is not itself a deviant one, the roles thus acquired will turn out to be appropriate for the social system in question.

At this point it is necessary to be more specific about the use of the concept of role as a conceptualization of human behavior. If one is describing the behavior of an individual in a known situation, anyone with common sense and intuition immediately apprehends and judges the behavior as either appropriate and realistic, or as inappropriate, mal-adaptive, or unrealistic. This immediate cognitive ability to relate behavior to situations is possible only for experiences within one’s own culture. Under such circumstances, the observer or the participant intuitively assigns the culturally appropriate roles to all who are participating in the situation. No need is felt for analytical dissection of the behavior patterns. In a strange situation, however, as in a foreign land, lack of prior experience makes such automatic allocations of behavior patterns impossible to achieve, and therefore the observer does not know how to de-
fine the situation. He does not know how to ‘under-
stand’ what is going on until it can be explained to
him in terms of the roles being played, the motives
activating them, and the goals implied in them.

The primary structural components of the social
situation—so far as its human participants are con-
cerned—can be conceived as a system of roles. Any
single individual obviously plays many roles—in the
occupational system (school teacher), in the family
(wife, mother, daughter), in the economic system
(consumer), in the political system (citizen, party
member, voter), and so forth. Each particular role
is culturally patterned, i.e., it is tailored to fit the
needs of the social system or sub-system in question.
This is to say that there are norms for each role which
all persons in the role are expected to follow, in out-
line at least. There is, of course, always individual
variation; no two people ever perform exactly alike
in any given role. Role expectations orient the re-
sponses of the participants somewhat as a magnet
orients previously randomly distributed iron filings
in the lines of magnetic force. The limited range of
response, analogous to the field of force, results from
the reciprocal roles the other participant or particip-
ants are forced to assume in relation to the one who
initiates the new situation. The initiator, who plays
the lead and structures the role situation, may be
doing something as innocuous and informal as chang-
ing the subject of conversation, asking a question, or
greeting another on the street. Nevertheless, by so
doing, he specifically orients and limits the possible
behavior of the others in the transaction. Although
the process of learning new and more appropriate role
responses is never finished, it is in childhood espe-
cially, that roles appropriate to the various statuses
are learned through reciprocal transactions with the
parents.

Another significant aspect of role playing is that it
is a form of communication. As such, it is dependent
upon a system of cues, signs, symbols, meanings and
values shared by the participants in the situation.
Without such sharing, communication in the sense
of meaningful interpretation of, and response to the
roles of the others would be impossible. Because of
the cognitive and evaluative aspects of such a shared
system of meanings and values, each role is accom-
panied by a set of complementary or counter-roles
based on reciprocity within the cognitive and evalu-
ative systems. In other words, the enacting of a
role is associated in the individual with a set of ex-
pectations of reciprocal role responses on the part of
others. The particular responses in the others then
determine further aspects of the role playing on the
part of the originator. To a certain extent, the role
responses of the others either gratify or frustrate the
expectations of the initiator. To this extent the
counter-role is interpreted as approval or disapproval
of the role behavior of the initiator. What is an ex-
pectation on the part of the initiator—i.e., how he
expects the other to respond to his role behavior—
is a sanction on the part of the participant—i.e., he
approves or disapproves the role of the initiator, and
vice versa.

It can be seen, then, that role behavior on the part
of two or more individuals involved in reciprocal
transaction both defines the situation and regulates it.
The regulation is established in two ways: first, by
the effect of the sanctioning function implicit in the
counter-role response; second, through the function-
ing of the shared system of meanings and values which
orient the actions of the participants.

The reader may wonder why so much attention is
given here to the significance of role playing. There
is probably no difficulty in perceiving its central im-
portance to a description of the socialization of chil-
dren. This topic can also be approached in terms of
learning theory and in terms of the psychoanalytical
theory of character development. Role theory, how-
ever, bites into the problem of child training from
the point of view of the social system, especially as it
is embodied in the family. Its specific contribution is
that it makes it possible to describe the development
of the child from the point of view of a plurality of
object relations. Because it is based on a transaction
system, inclusive of the self and others, it can prove
to be a useful link between the intra-personal systems
of id, ego, and super-ego, and the inter-personal sys-
tems of primary groups, such as the family, on the
basis of which the former derives its characteristic
stamp. Such a link also provides a mechanism whereby
cultural value orientations can be described simulta-
neously from the point of view of the individual and
from that of society. Because of this it opens up
immense vistas for cross-disciplinary collaboration
and research.

There is one other way in which role theory is sig-
nificant to the aims of this report. As was stated
above, it provides a method for defining the structure
of a situation in terms of the roles of the participants.
In this way it establishes the possibility of analyzing
the state of a transaction system. The system may
be stable and persistent, changing in an adaptive
fashion, enduring with difficulty because of inner con-
licts, or disintegrating. Where families are the sys-
tem under scrutiny, it is our stated intention to dis-
cover methods for detecting states of deviance and
pathology and to distinguish them from various
states of stability or adaptive change which have
healthier implications for the emotional adjustments
of the members. The description of the family in
terms of the roles of its members supplies an analytical
method for approaching these variations in structure
and function. The roles can be inspected for incom-
patibility and conflict both as an internal system, and
in relation to the integration of the family with the
other parts of the social systems.

Some roles are general in character, others are
specific. An example is the difference between the
general role—woman—and the specific role—wife or
parent. Furthermore, sociologists, as well as anthro-
pologists, have shown that some roles are ascribed
in accordance with invariant points of reference such
as age, sex, or membership in a particular social
group, such as a caste or class, whereas other roles
are acquired through effort, achievement or failure
throughout the lifetime of the individual. It is in
family transactions that age and sex and other as-
cribed roles are initially learned. Apparently no other
organized group can supply the variety and inter-play of ascribed and acquired roles allocated to so few individuals. In residential institutions for children, in contrast, the roles are strung out among a wide variety of parent substitutes who have attained their position by achievement. The lack of ascriptive foci for the roles undermines the emotional poignancy of interpersonal relations. No one really "belongs" to anyone.

It is this factor of 'belonging,' by "right" of membership, that underlies a group of functions which the family shares with other parts of the social system. These include the satisfaction and integration of biologic and psychologic needs, the performance of subsistence and maintenance functions, the observance of cultural and religious rituals, the more formal education of the children, and recreational activities.

There is enormous cultural diversity in the degree to which these functions are allocated to the family, or shared and assigned to other institutions. In our country, for example, education and recreation are shared with the schools, subsistence activities are shared with the occupational structure. The middle class, urban family—as a whole—participates very little in these functions. Individual members of the family, taking advantage of the elaborate division of labor in the industrial community, enact these roles through group membership in other organizations or through purchase of services. In all societies, however, all these functions are performed to some extent by the family. Even in our highly specialized communities, there is always cleaning, mending, laundry, cooking, care of the sick, picnics, helping with homework, watching television, and so forth to be done in the home.

It can be seen from this method of analysis that social roles are a method of conceptualizing behavioral processes of transaction between individuals from the point of view of the social system. It is only by looking at the whole social system that one can segregate primary roles from occupational and recreational roles. Looked at from the point of view of the individual, however, these same social roles now appear related to inner needs and drives. A role is a socially regulated way of satisfying instinctual needs in an organized system of action. If this is true, then any discussion of the functions of the family must include not only the description of the particular configuration of roles which characterizes this primary group—depending upon the social system in which it functions—but also it must deal with the way these roles satisfy certain crucial needs of the individuals composing it.

Unfortunately, a consideration of this dual nature of the family—or of any primary group, for that matter—as the organized bridge between the individual and his needs and the social system and its needs, precipitates us into the middle of a thorny theoretical problem. There is no uniform conceptual system for characterizing the needs of the individual. Instincts, drives, or needs are differently conceived and assembled in various schools of thought. The underlying assumption in all the various theories is that organic functions and "instinctual" processes are transformed in some way into the deferred aims and symbolic goals characteristic of role playing. The difficulty is that currently there is no easy way of dovetailing these conceptual systems with the theory of roles on which we have based our analysis of family processes. It is necessary, therefore, to by-pass this important theoretical problem and to discuss individual needs in a more general, non-specific fashion.

The socialization of children is an expression which covers—from the psychological focus—a cluster of intimately related individual needs. The biological need of the child for continual nourishment and physical maintenance during the prolonged period of dependency has already been mentioned. The family is certainly not the only agency that can satisfy this need in our society, but it is the most important one. More important, perhaps, is the child's need for love, approval, and security. This latter need can tentatively be further specified as the need for a consistent pattern of rewards and punishments in the context of a basic emotional acceptance and understanding of the child by its parents or parent substitutes.

These needs of the child cannot be adequately discussed without simultaneous consideration of the individual needs of other members of the nuclear family—siblings, mother, and father. The mother-child patterns of transaction are the processes which have been most extensively studied in this area. The early symbiotic nature of the mother-child relationship and the gradual loosening and differentiation of the relationship with the changing needs of both mother and child have been stressed. The significance of the child as an emotional object for the mother and also the unconscious identification of the child with various significant objects from the mother's past life have also been emphasized. The mother-child relationship, however, is not isolated from other family processes. Here especially the needs of the father vis-a-vis with both mother and child, and of mother toward child and father, introduce complexities into family processes. Mother and father "need" (according to the specific cultural patterning) love, security, understanding, and sexual satisfaction in their relations with each other. But this system of needs is continuously modified by the competing systems of mother-child, father-child. Where there is more than one child, further imbalance is introduced by multiple assemblies of such triangulated need systems. Some of the most pressing problems in the etiology of mental health and ill health arise from degrees of good or bad "fit" among the triangular relationships which constitute the internal structure and function of the nuclear family. An extensive discussion of this crucial topic is to be deferred for subsequent reports.

It is evident that the conceptual items in the theory of social roles are not made up out of whole cloth but are already imbedded in our everyday language as a sort of pre-conceptual wisdom. It is impossible, for example, to make generalizations about the distribution of needs or drives among the various members of the family without referring them to the social role of the individual member under observation. We have to talk about the generalized father, mother, daughter...
or son in order to have a way of locating the observed drive in time and space. This is to say that needs are already specified to social roles in the ordinary currency of our discourse. Our problem, then, is to distinguish the various social roles from the point of view of their adequacy, their capacity for integrating particular needs. This may turn out to be something of an artificial problem created by a concealed value assumption, since we do not as yet know the degree to which the needs or drives which we can perceive (as well as the very act of observation) are shaped by the cultural patterning processes of a particular society. It is well to remind ourselves repeatedly that the observer is himself a part of the total field and is influenced or thrown off balance by it at the moment of observation as well as later in moments of reflection and conceptualization. Nevertheless, so far as one can discern in the present state of our knowledge, roles can be matched for the degree of satisfaction they provide and for their manner of organizing particular needs.

From this point of view it would appear that the family role relationships of husband-wife, father-mother, parent-child, and so forth, are the most appropriate ways of organizing and satisfying the particular needs of the individual discussed above—at least, for our society. At the same time it is quite clear that these role relationships do not exhaust the ways of organizing the satisfaction of the same needs. So far as its total function in the social system is concerned, the family shares this function with other social structures characterized by variant social roles. In the matter of sexual satisfaction, for example, the husband-wife roles parallel other variant or deviant role relationships such as that with prostitutes, the brief "affair," or homosexuality. We have already mentioned social structures which share with the family some of the aspects of the socialization of children such as orphanages and the "foster" family. The strategic importance of the school system for the more formal cognitive and group oriented aspects of child training has also received comment. Obviously much more could be said about the relations between individual needs and role structuring, but for our present purposes it is only necessary to emphasize that although the degree of sharing of these functions varies from society to society, in every known society the family remains the central and apparently indispensable agency for satisfying such individual needs.

In order to account for the various forms which these universal aspects of family structure take in different societies and sub-groups, it is now necessary to discuss cultural value orientations. Not until this focus of organization with the total field of human behavior has been presented will a groundwork be laid to frame a typology of families—i.e., to make descriptive comparisons between various types of families within a society with a view to isolating unhealthy and deviant from healthy dominant or variant types.

III
The System of Values to which the Family is Oriented

Credit must be given primarily to the cultural anthropologists for calling our attention to the tremendous variability in human behavior, as determined by cultural patterns. This variation includes not only moral standards and mores, but also extends to the subtler issues of motivation and patterns of interpersonal relations. The variations in existential judgments and systems of belief, such as are found in various religious orientations, philosophies and science, while not new to us, have been integrated by the cultural anthropologists with other cultural patterns such as child rearing practices, in a new way. As a result of the novel synthesis, we now have a clearer understanding of the relationship between the psychology of the individual and the culture in which he develops and to which he is adapted. Owing to their work, it is now no longer possible to assume that generalizations based on observing individuals in one culture have a universal applicability.

A number of anthropologists have developed slightly varying concepts for dealing with the generalized meanings in a cultural tradition and have shown the significance of the differences in these meanings for the understanding of the differences in the behavior of individuals trained in varying cultural traditions. Almost all of the concepts also stress the critically important fact of the individual's lack of conscious awareness of most of the cultural values which so greatly influence his motivational system and action patterns.

But in spite of the new insights provided by the concepts, most of them have had a limited usefulness in the analysis of the relationships between psychological and cultural processes. For the most part, the difficulties in using them arise from an absence of a systematic theory of cultural variation and the consequent tendency to rely too heavily upon mere empirical generalizations. The concepts have been both too empirically particularized to single cultures to permit systematic comparisons between cultures and too grossly generalized to allow for an analysis of variations within cultures. All too frequently the persons who have ably demonstrated a uniqueness in the value systems of different societies have ignored the fundamental fact of the universality of human problems and its correlate that human societies have found for some problems approximately the same answers. Also, in most of the discussions of the common value element in the many patterns of a culture, the dominant values of peoples have been overstressed and variant values largely ignored. These two concomitant tendencies have produced interpretative studies which are, in spite of their brilliance of insight, over-simplified and static representations of social structures and processes. Variation for the same individual when he plays different roles and variation within whole groups of persons in a single society have not been adequately accounted for. Yet it is precisely this kind of variation which is crucial for the conceptual integration of psychological and social or cultural processes.

The classification scheme and theory of variation in basic cultural values we shall use for our treatment of family patterns, stems from all these previous concepts of variability, but it differs in that it rests upon several assumptions which postulate a systematic
variation in value orientations both between and within cultures.\textsuperscript{13}

Before presenting these assumptions, it is necessary to state the meaning of the term value orientation. In the main the definition of it being followed is that stated by Clyde Kluckhohn:

It is convenient to use the term value-orientation for those value elements which are (a) general, (b) organized, and (c) include definitely existential judgments. A value-orientation is a set of linked propositions embracing both value and existential elements. . . .

Since value elements and existential premises are almost inextricably blended in the over-all picture of experience that characterizes an individual or a group, it seems well to call this over-all view a 'value-orientation,' symbolizing the fact that the affective-cognitive (value) and strictly cognitive (orientation) elements are blended. More formally, a value-orientation may be defined as a generalized and organized conception, influencing behavior, of nature, of man's place in it, of man's relation to man, and of the desirable and non-desirable as they relate to man-environment and interhuman relations. . . . Like values they vary on a continuum from the explicit to the implicit.\textsuperscript{14}

The first of the major assumptions for our classification and theory of value-orientation variation relates to the number of value-orientation areas: There is a limited number of common human problems for which all peoples at all times and in all places must find some solution.

The second assumption is that while there is variability in solutions of the problems it is neither limitless nor random but is instead a variability within a range of possible solutions.

The third assumption, which provides the key for the analysis of variation, is that all variants (all alternatives) of all solutions are in varying degrees present in the total cultural structure of every society. There will be, in other words, in every society not only a dominant profile of value orientations, which is made up of those orientations most highly evaluated, but also variant or substitute profiles of orientations.

Five problems have been tentatively singled out as the crucial ones common to all human groups. These problems are stated here in the form of questions and in each case there is a parenthetical designation of the name which will be used henceforth for the range of orientations relating to the question.

1) What is the character of innate human nature? (Human-nature orientation)
2) What is the relation of man to nature? (Man-nature orientation)
3) What is the temporal focus of human life? (Time orientation)
4) What is the modality of human activity? (Activity orientation)
5) What is the modality of man's relationship to other men? (Relational orientation)

The ranges of variability suggested as a testable conceptualization of the variation in the value orientations are given in Diagram I.

1. Human-Nature Orientation. To the question of what innate human nature is, there are the three logical divisions of Evil, Good and Evil, and Good. Yet it may be argued that the conception of Good and Evil is not one but two categories. There certainly is a significant difference between the view that human nature is simply neutral and the view of it as a mixture of the good and bad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Innate Human Nature</th>
<th>Ev@l</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Mixture of Good &amp; Evil</th>
<th>Good</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mut@ble-Imm@table</td>
<td>Mut@ble-Imm@table</td>
<td>Mut@ble-Imm@table</td>
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<tr>
<td>Man's Relation to Nature and Supernature</td>
<td>Subjugation to Nature</td>
<td>Harmony with Nature</td>
<td>Mastery over Nature</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Focus</td>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality of Human Activity</td>
<td>Being</td>
<td>Being-in-Becoming</td>
<td>Doing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality of Man's Relationship to Other Men</td>
<td>Lineal</td>
<td>Collateral</td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Since each of the orientations is considered to be independently variable, the arrangement in columns of sets of orientations is only the accidental result of this particular diagram. Any of the orientations may be switched to any one of the three columns.

Moreover, the sub-principles of mutability and immutability increase the basic threefold classification to six possibilities. Human nature can, for example, be conceived to be Evil and unalterable or Evil and perfectible; as Good and unalterable or Good and corruptible; as an invariant mixture of the Good and Evil or as a mixture subject to influence. Thus, one may rightly question the validity and usefulness of
the three-way classification suggested for the range of this orientation. However, the three categories do seem adequate as a first approximation in making major differentiations. Furthermore, it may well prove to be the case that some of the finer distinctions noted in specific values and behavior patterns are derivates of an interrelationship between the human-nature and other of the orientations. There is also a possibility that other desirable distinctions can be achieved by the use of a set of concepts which are the derivates of the cross-classification of the basic three-way categorization and the twofold subcategorization.

But leaving aside possible derivates at this time let us illustrate from American culture itself some of the major variations. Few will disagree that the orientation inherited from Puritan ancestors and still strong among many Americans is that of a basically Evil but perfectible human nature. According to this view, constant control and discipline of the self are required if any real goodness is to be achieved, and the danger of regression is always present. But some in the United States today, perhaps a growing number, incline to the view that human nature is a mixture of the Good and Evil. These would say that although control and effort are certainly needed, lapses can be understood and need not always be severely condemned. This latter definition of basic human nature would appear to be a more common one among peoples of the world, both literate and non-literate, than the one held to in the historical past of the United States. Whether there are any total societies committed to the definition of human nature as immutably Good is to be doubted. Yet the position is a possible one, and it certainly should be found as an alternative definition within societies.

2. Man-Nature Orientation. The three-point range of variation in the man-nature orientation—Subjugation to Nature, Harmony with Nature and Mastery over Nature—is too well known from the works of philosophers and culture historians to need much explanation. Mere illustration will demonstrate the differences.

In years past at least, Spanish-American culture in the American Southwest gave us an example of very definite Subjugation-to-Nature orientation. The typical Spanish-American sheep herder in a time as recent as fifteen years ago believed firmly that there was little or nothing a man could do to save or protect either land or flocks when damaging storms descended upon them. He simply accepted the inevitable. In Spanish-American attitudes toward illness and death one finds the same fatalism. “If it is the Lord’s will that I die, I shall die,” is the way they express it, and many a Spanish-American has been known to refuse the services of a doctor because of the attitude.

If the conceptualization of the man-nature relationship is that of man’s Harmony with Nature, there is no real separation between man and nature. One is but the extension of the other and both are needed to make a whole. This orientation would seem to have been the dominant one in certain of the past centuries of Chinese society.

A third way of conceptualizing this relationship is that of man’s Mastery of Nature. With this view, which is clearly characteristic of Americans, natural forces are something to be overcome and put to the use of human beings. We span our rivers with bridges, blast through our mountains to make tunnels, make lakes where none existed, and do a thousand and one other things to exploit nature and make it serve our human needs. In general, this means that we have an orientation to life which is that of overcoming obstacles. It is difficult for us to understand the kind of people who accept the obstacle and give in to it or even the people who stress the harmonious oneness of man and nature.

3. Time Orientation. Concerning the definition of the human being’s place in time, it should again be apparent that there is always a Past to be reckoned with, a Present time in which we live, and a Future which lies ahead. No society ever does, or ever can, completely ignore any of the three time periods. Yet how greatly societies differ as to which of the three dimensions they stress or make dominant!

Spanish-Americans, whom we have seen take the attitude that man is a victim of natural forces, are also a people who emphasize Present-time. They pay little attention to what has happened in the past, and regard the future as a vague and most unpredictable period. Planning for the future or hoping that the future will be better than either present or past is not the Spanish-American way of life.

China of past generations, and to some extent still, was a society which put its main emphasis upon Past-time. The ancestor worship and the strong family tradition were both expressions of this Past-time orientation. So also was the Chinese attitude that nothing new ever happened in the present or would happen in the future.

Many modern European countries have tended to stress the past. Even England—in so far as it has been dominated by an aristocracy and traditionalism—has voiced this emphasis. Indeed, one of the chief differences between ourselves and the English is to be found in our somewhat varying attitudes toward time. We have difficulty in understanding the respect the English have for tradition, and they do not appreciate our disregard for it.

Americans, more than most people of the world, place an emphasis upon Future-time—a future which we anticipate to be “bigger and better.” This does not mean we have no regard for the past or fail to give thought to the present. But it certainly is true that no current generation of Americans ever wants to be called “old-fashioned.” We do not consider the ways of the past to be good just because they are past, and we are seldom content with the present. This makes of us a people who place a high value on change.

4. Activity Orientation. What is the modality of human activity is the fourth of the common human problems in the value orientation system, and the range of variation in solutions suggested for it is the threefold one of Being, Being-in-Becoming and Doing.
In very large part this range of variation has been derived from the distinctions made long ago by philosophers between the Being and the Becoming. Moreover, the three-way distinction is to some degree similar to the classification of personality components made by the philosopher Charles Morris. The component which he labels the Dionysian and defines as being the personality component type which releases and indulges existing desires, is somewhat the meaning of the Being orientation. The Apollonian component which he defines as being self-contained and self-controlled through meditation and detachment has some similarity to our Being-in-Becoming orientation. Similarities can also be noted between his active, striving Prometheus component and the Doing orientation.

However, the accordances with the concepts of philosophy are far from complete. In the conceptual scheme of value orientations the terms Being and Becoming, which are expanded to a three-point range of Being, Being-in-Becoming and Doing, are much more narrowly defined than has been the custom of philosophers. Furthermore, we hold to the view that this range of orientations varies independently of those which deal with the relation of man to nature, with time and with basic human nature. The tendency of philosophers, writing with different aims, has been to treat these several types of orientations as relatively undifferentiated clusters.

The range of the three orientations centers solely on the problem of the nature of man's mode of self expression in activity. Each mode is definitely considered to be a type of activity. The differences between them are not, therefore, those which the dichotomy of active-passive, for example, distinguish.

In the Being orientation the preference is for the kind of activity which is a spontaneous expression of what is conceived to be "given" in the human personality. As compared with either the Being-in-Becoming or Doing orientations, it puts a stress upon a non-developmental conception of activity. It might even be phrased as a spontaneous expression in activity of impulses and desires; yet care must be taken not to make this interpretation a too literal one. In no society, as Clyde Kluckhohn has commented, does one ever find a one-to-one relationship between the desired and the desirable. The concrete behavior of individuals in complex situations and the moral codes governing that behavior usually reflect all the orientations simultaneously. A stress upon the "insness" of the personality and a spontaneous expression of that "insness" is not pure license, as we can easily see if we turn our attention to a society or segments of a society in which the Being orientation is dominant. Mexican society, for example, is clearly one in which the Being orientation is dominant. Their wide-range patterning of Fiesta activities alone shows this. Yet never in the Fiesta with its emphasis on spontaneity, is there pure impulse gratification. The value demands of other of the orientations—the relational orientation, and the conception of human nature as being good and evil and in need of control—make for codes which restrain the activities of individuals in very definite ways.

The Being-in-Becoming orientation shares with the Being a great concern with what the human being is rather than what he can accomplish, but here the similarity ends. In the Being-in-Becoming orientation the idea of development, so little stressed in the Being orientation, is paramount.

Erich Fromm's conception of "the spontaneous activity of the total integrated personality" is close to the Being-in-Becoming type. "By activity," he states, "we do not mean 'doing something' but rather the quality of the creative activity which can operate in one's emotional, intellectual and sensuous experiences and in one's will as well. One premise of this spontaneity is the acceptance of the total personality and the elimination of the split between 'reason' and 'nature'." A less favorably prejudiced and, for our purposes, a more accurately limited statement would be: the Being-in-Becoming orientation emphasizes the kind of activity which has as its goal the development of all aspects of the self as an integrated whole.

The Doing orientation is so characteristically the dominant one in American society that there is little need for an extensive discussion of it. Its most distinguishing feature is a demand for the kind of activity which results in accomplishments that are measurable by standards conceived to be external to the acting individual. That aspect of self-judgment or judgment of others which relates to the nature of activity is based mainly upon a measurable accomplishment achieved by acting upon persons, things or situations. What does the individual do, what can he or will he accomplish, are almost always the primary questions in our scale of appraisal of persons. "Getting things done" and finding ways "to do something" about any and all situations are stock American phrases.

Fromm also considers this orientation to be different from the one he defines in his concept of spontaneity, but he does not define it an equally favored position. Instead he actually condemns it as a fertile source of neurotically compulsive behavior. While few would disagree that the Doing orientation of Americans leads to a comparison and competition with others which is often extreme and intense, we do not as yet know just how often the competition either leads to or reflects compulsion in the technical sense of the term.

5. Relational Orientation. The fifth and last of the common human problems treated in the conceptual scheme is the definition of man's relation to other men. This orientation has three sub-divisions: the Lineal, the Collateral and the Individualistic.

It is in the nature of the case that all societies—all groups—must give some attention to all three principles. Individual autonomy cannot be and is not ignored by the most extreme type of collectivistic society. Collaterality is found in all societies. The individual is not a human being outside a group and one kind of group emphasis is that put upon laterally extended relationships. These are the immediate relationships in time and place. All societies must also pay some attention to the fact that individuals are biologically and culturally related to each other through time. This is to say that there is always a Lineal principle in relationships which is derived
from age and generational differences and cultural tradition. The fundamental question is always that of emphasis.

For some types of problems it may be sufficient to differentiate only between the individual and the collectivity. In most cases, however, it would appear highly important to know what kind of collectivist principle is being stressed. A society which places its major emphasis upon the Lineal principle—as do, for example, the Japanese and some upper-class Americans—will have quite different evaluations of right and proper relationships from the society which puts a first order emphasis upon the Individualistic principle (e.g., most Americans).

There will always be variability in the primacy and nature of goals according to which of the three principles is stressed. If the Individualistic principle is dominant and the other two interpreted in terms of it, individual goals will have primacy over the goals of either the Collateral or Lineal group. When the Collateral principle is dominant, the goals—or welfare—of the laterally extended group have primacy for all individuals. The group in this case is viewed as being moderately independent of other similar groups and the question of continuity through time is not critical. When the Lineal principle is most heavily stressed, it is again group goals which are of primary concern to individuals, but there is the additional factor that an important one of those goals is continuity through time. Both continuity and ordered positional succession are of great importance when Lineality dominates the relational system.

How the continuity and ordered positional succession are achieved in the Lineal system is separate from the principle as such. It does in fact seem to be the case that the most successful way of maintaining the stress on Lineality is through mechanisms which are either actual hereditary ones based upon biological relatedness or ones which are assimilated to a kinship system. The English, for example, maintained into the present time a strong Lineality by consistently moving successful members of their more Individualistic middle class into the established peerage system. Other societies have found other but similar mechanisms.

Variation in Values Orientations.

In this delineation of the ranges of value-orientations attention has been focused mainly upon dominant orientation emphases. But however important it is to know what is dominant in a society at a given time, we shall not go far toward understanding the dynamics of that society without paying careful heed to the variant orientations. That there be individuals and whole groups of individuals who live in accordance with patterns which express the variant rather than the dominantly stressed orientations is essential to the maintenance of the society.

Variant values are, as has been indicated in our third basic assumption, not only permitted but actually required. It has been a frequent fallacy of many to treat all behavior and certain aspects of motivation which do not accord with the dominant values as deviant behavior. Lack of adequate criteria has often led us to confuse the deviant, who by his behavior calls down the sanctions of his group, with the variant, who is accepted and indeed required. This is especially true in a society such as ours, where beneath the surface of what has so often been called our compulsive conformity there lies a wide range of variation. The dynamic inter-play of the dominant and the variant is one of the outstanding features of American society, although it has been little analyzed or understood. We laud or condemn the "melting pot" ideology, accept or reject what we frequently term the contradictions of our society, but have not examined carefully the processes which create what we so readily judge.

We cannot in this report treat the kinds of variation or the reasons for them. However, it is a central theoretical proposition in all that is to follow on the analysis of family systems, that there is an ordered cultural variation (a web of variation) in all social systems.

IV Integrations and Mal-integrations in Spanish-American Family Patterns

We have now completed the sketching in of the main elements in the theoretical framework we propose to use for the analysis of the family as a system of behavior. It is to be remembered that we consider this behavioral system to exist in a transactional field of inter-dependent systems. However, for the sake of simplicity and convenience we intend to confine this report to an examination of the inter-dependence of only four of the multiple systems transacting in the total field: (1) the geographical place or territorial reference of the transacting systems, (2) the system of cultural value orientations, (3) the extended social system, existing in that place with reference to the particular system of cultural value orientations, and (4) the family, as a system of social role patterns, inter-dependent with the place, the values, and the social system.

Since the transactional field is a unity of inter-penetrating processes, each of these four systems is molded by the others; each one is reflected in all the others. There is no linear causal chain of events connecting them, but only reverberating processes taking place between and among all of them. In order to bring out as clearly as possible how this happens, we propose to compare two very different assemblies of these systems. The first is the patterns of family life among the Spanish-Americans of the American Southwest. The second is the role patterning of family life in the dominant middle class large urban center in the United States. We believe that the contrast is sufficiently vivid to reflect clearly both the invariant and variant relations which we would like to make explicit.

The Spanish-Americans of the Southwest—a people who are, of course, a part of total American society—have had until quite recently, an order of value orientations which is in startling contrast with dominant middle class American values. Ignoring for the moment the variant and deviant values within each of the groups, we can outline the contrasts in dominant value orientations as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relational</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Man-Nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-American</td>
<td>Lineal</td>
<td>Being</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Subjugation to Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Anglo Americans</td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td>Doing</td>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Mastery over Nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, let us see how the Spanish-American system of value orientations is reflected in and maintained by their social system and family role structuring. The first point is that to a large degree the whole social system and the family system coincide. The social system is formed to a much larger extent than in our communities by a network of inter-related families. Although the pattern is now slowly changing, the Spanish-Americans lived characteristically in small village units. Recently, economic and other pressures have served to push many of them out into the cities as laborers and have thus disrupted some of the old patterns. Yet, even in towns and cities today, they still tend to live, wherever possible, in some kind of inter-related group.

In the villages most of the persons are related to each other by blood and marriage ties. In fact such villages are little more than a large group of inter-related families. In one well-known village in New Mexico every family has the same surname. Within this network of biologically related people the occasional unrelated person is apt to have none too easy a time. Until he can establish some kind of relationship, he remains an outsider about whom there is always some concern and even suspicion. In part such hostility results from the fact that social control in these villages is exercised mainly through the family. It is not shared, as it is in our communities, with such agencies as the police and law courts.

The extensive inter-relatedness of the Spanish-American village community is achieved by wide range recognition of kinship ties both vertically through the generations, and laterally, to include fifth and sixth degree cousins, and finally, by a general extension to include all who are however remotely related. Neither the pattern of relatedness nor the actual number of relations differs greatly from the situation in our communities. What is different is the strength of the ties which bind them all together. The basic nuclear family of husband, wife, and children exists just as it does in all societies. Yet, a true Spanish-American would feel extremely impoverished if the only relatives he had about him were his wife and children. His nieces and nephews are almost the same to him as his sons and daughters, and his cousins are very little different from his brothers and sisters. Everyone disciplines nieces and nephews as readily and as efficiently as he does his own children—to say nothing of feeding and caring for them in addition. There is a general and almost casual sharing of children. Since it is felt that a family without children—four to eight or ten of them are preferred—is not a family, the unfortunate family without children will usually take one, two or three of those belonging to sisters or brothers or even other people who have too many. Some ten to twelve percent of all the children in one village, for example, were found to be living with persons other than their parents. It can readily be seen that the Spanish-Americans do not have the anxieties about adoption which many Anglo-Americans have. It can also be seen that such relative unconcern about who gets which child could not take place if they placed as much value on individualism as we do.

The authority lines—the Lineal accenting of relational values—in the Spanish-American family system are definite and firm. The old people are the rulers; the male sex is clearly dominant. Respect for and obedience to age are bred into the Spanish-American child at an early age and are never forgotten. Sons do not expect to become independent upon reaching maturity. Only one son—the eldest—is permitted by custom to have any kind of authority and responsibility. Even he must remain subservient to the father’s control until death or infancy of the father makes it necessary for him to take over the family affairs. This special training of the oldest son is so pointed that the younger brothers and sisters treat him more as a father than as a sibling. The social mechanism which shapes the role of the oldest son is concerned with preserving the continuity of authority by age. With such large families it often happens that the father dies before all the children have reached maturity. The oldest son then moves into the father’s position and all is supposed to go on as before.

The authority relations centered about age and other ascribed roles are not confined to the family system in the Spanish-American community. They are generalized and extended to include a kind of feudal relation called the patron-peon system. One powerful and dominant family, the head of which is the patron, rules the whole village in much the same fashion as fathers rule the families. Those under the control of the patron are sometimes called peones—or more frequently simply la gente (the people). Between patron and peones there is a relationship very similar to that which existed between the lord of the feudal manor and his serfs. Furthermore, beyond the patron there is still another authority—the village saint. The Spanish-American Catholic’s interest in his own particular patron saint is far greater than it is in the more abstract aspects of the religion. It is he who is considered most responsible for everyone’s welfare, and for whom the big annual Fiesta is given. In this way, the Lineal accenting of relational values is synchronized with the Man-Nature range of value orientations, with regard to which the Spanish-American views himself as subservient to and dependent upon forces in nature.

We have already mentioned the dominance of the men in the Spanish-American family system as an example of the importance of ascribed characteristics. It is true that in the larger towns and cities the Spanish-American women today do take jobs and assume many of the achievement aspects of the Anglo-American women. In the villages, however, the Spanish-
American woman has only one career to look forward to—that of wife and mother. There is none of the equality between the sexes which is so significant in our social system. Instead there is a clear cut division of labor and of rights and obligations. The lives of most of the women in the villages were, until recently, so circumscribed that they were not even permitted to market in the village store. The store was a meeting place for the men—hence neither safe nor proper for the women. Men and children bought all supplies.

Yet, for all the restrictions, which to us seem great, the feminine role offers the Spanish-American women great security. They expect their marriages to be permanent, and they usually are. They know exactly what is to be expected in every aspect of their roles. By the age of twelve almost every village girl is quite well trained for her future job of housewife and mother. She moves into her adult role through an easy transition without having to face such vexatious and anxiety inducing problems as the question of what sort of a boy to marry, or whether to choose a career instead of marriage.

According to our dominant American standards, the Spanish-American patterns of living undoubtedly seem exceedingly repressive. Seen from the point of view required by the Spanish-American orientations, the picture looks quite different. Familiaristic ties—both Lineal and Collateral—bind them on every side and keep them dependent. Yet in that very dependence there is a definite security and safety. Even the patron, who has so much authority to demand obedience to himself and his commands, has many obligations to his people. It is he who often manages the economic affairs of the many families, he who guides and counsels in times of crisis, and who has the major village responsibility.

Within individual families great stress is placed upon group cohesion. Each member of the family is responsible to all the others in accordance with his particular position. Without this extensive interdependence the Spanish-Americans could not long maintain their present time orientation to life. It is one thing to accept each day for what it is and to enjoy it when one has many relatives to depend on if things should go badly. Such an attitude may be quite destructive, however, if independence and responsibility for self are the prevailing rules. An example to the point is a case reported in the study made by Dr. Florence R. Kluckhohn in 1936. The families of a father and two married sons constituted a single economic unit. Once they had been a land and livestock owning family in which all male members had worked at a common task. By 1936 all property was gone, but the old patterns persisted—even though from our point of view each of the individual family heads was now an independent wage earner. All three families maintained a common larder and all continued to contribute to the support of all. At no time did all three of the wage earning men work simultaneously. At any time that two had moderately good jobs the third was certain to be on a trip or vacation of some sort or simply resting at home. Since two could make all that any of them required or needed, why should all three be driving ahead?

Indeed, there was nothing in particular to drive toward. For, as we have already pointed out, Spanish-Americans seldom expect that the future will be bigger or better than the past. That which is is good enough, and most show small concern for the future.

Correlated to this point of view, and of equal importance, is the acceptance of the inevitable. The whole system of relationships—those of the family, but especially those of peones to their patron—tends to preserve what exists, and leaves little room for achievement or ambition. Change is not expected and improvement is scarcely even a dream. The family's standard of living remains the same generation after generation, with only microscopic alterations. Peones remain peones, younger brothers stay in their places, and for a woman to challenge masculine dominance is unthinkable.

Thus we see that Spanish-American value orientations are—or at any rate were—fully expressed in family patterns. It is also evident that, reciprocally, the family patterns foster and maintain the value orientations. This is to say that both systems participate in a transactional field. It is central to our thesis, however, and to our search for factors responsible for mental health in families, that the transactions between the two systems are not always well integrated. There is undoubted security in the Spanish-American patterns, but there are also definite strains and inadequate "fits" among the tightly knit relationships. The child is accepted for himself as few American children are. He is not driven or urged to be independent and ambitious. On the contrary, the training is consistently—except in the case of the oldest son—for a lack of initiative and responsibility. There is much evidence that this emphasis is too rigid. Although we are not considering the impact of biological variation on family patterns, there is no doubt that the Spanish-American values work a hardship on those children constitutionally endowed with greater reactivity, vigor, and energy. The most frequent conflicts occur in the relation between the older and younger brothers. Recent research in the area has shown that the family relationships have undergone considerable change in the past fifteen years. Especially is this to be noted in the breaking down of the oldest brother-younger brother relationship and the consequent intense conflict within or disruption of the family.

There has been an increasing shift from Lineally organized relationships to Individualistic ones, but as yet little or no change has occurred in any of the other Spanish-American value orientations. Disorganization within the structure of the family, and also in the personalities of family members is the striking result of the process. Delinquency among adolescents has increased rapidly, divorce has become more common, in-group taboos have broken down, and perhaps most important of all one notes in many of those who are middle aged or older attitudes of bewildernent and hopelessness. Only a very few at any age level have become thoroughly acculturated in the ways of Anglo-American life. A majority are seeking new patterns of adaptation which it would seem certain will not be free of strain for individuals, because an Individualistic relational orientation simply
does not fit well with either a Being activity or a Present time orientation. It is one thing to live in the present and act in accord with feelings when one has a Lineal family system which assures both economic support and firm regulatory norms for the impulse life; it is quite another when the individual or the small nuclear family lives alone.

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Integrations and Mal-integrations in American Middle Class Family Patterns

The Spanish-American family patterns—as they were until quite recently—are good representatives of what is often termed a “familistic” society. In examining the contrast with American family patterns it is important to keep in mind that the Spanish-American situation is not atypical. On the contrary, a majority of the peoples of the world tend to be familistic to some degree. They tend to emphasize either the Lineal or Collateral relational principle rather than the Individualistic one. It is the American pattern that is more atypical—if for no other reason than its reflection of the extreme stress on Individualistic relations. However, there are other ways in which the dominant American ensemble of value orientations is unique. We have already mentioned the extraordinary emphasis on Doing in the range of the activity orientation and the accenting of Future Time. Indeed, this latter orientation goes so far that we often appear to have forgotten how to enjoy the present for its own sake. Perhaps this accounts for the existence of what David Reisman has called our “fun morality”—a compulsive search for enjoyment through ritualized and institutionalized “entertainment” in which having fun, having-a-good-time, has to be planned for and “achieved.” The difficulty here is that if one has to “plan” to enjoy the future, spontaneity tends to be vitiated by the time the future becomes the present.

That there may be some other difficulties flowing from the severe stress on these value orientations, will be taken up shortly in our examination of American family patterns. Here it is sufficient to point out that there is a good deal of harmonious interlocking of the value orientations in the ramification of roles that constitute our social system. The emphasis on achievement requires a considerable planning for the future, a step by step thinking out of the means-ends patterns by which future success may be secured. At the same time, this preference for far-flung and distant aims tends to place a great premium on the young—those with the most future ahead of them. Overlooking, for the moment, in what position this accent on youth may leave those who have long since lost it, we can nevertheless recognize that it is the individual who reaps the rewards and around whom all the planning centers. Without a selective sanctioning of Individualistic over Lineal and Collateral relations, the individual would never be free to realize his plans, to leave his family, his home town or his job for a better situation. Along with the planning and achievement values is synchronized the optimism derived from our emphasis on Man’s Mastery of Nature. Our conviction that we can always improve matters by thoughtful care and planning, our belief in “progress” through “scientific achievement” gives our industrial, job-centered society its characteristic stamp, and thus supports the system of mobile occupational roles through which the plans for achievement are to be realized.

If we now observe how the dominant American value orientations are reflected in the patterns of American family life, we face problems of selectivity and special emphasis. For it is possible to speak of The American Family only if we realize that we mean the ideal or typical family of the dominant middle class. Actually there is no such thing as a single family type which can be said to be representative of all America. We have the kind of variation in families which results from our having within one nation large groups of people with quite different cultural backgrounds—groups which still have recent memories of other countries. There are also all the families which are midway between those of rather clear-cut ethnic background and those dominantly American. Differences of another kind can be distinguished in the families of the several economic class levels. Furthermore, aside from all such differences as these, there is much more diversity in individual families—even those of the middle class—than is commonly the case in most societies.

It is this very diversity which leads to the stressing of the dominant or “typical” family pattern. We could not long hold together all our differences if there were not at the same time a strong sense of conformity and oneness. Thus there exists a kind of consensus regarding the relationships and roles that should exist in the “Good Family.” There is, in other words, a kind of model family according to which all others tend to be judged and like which many others are striving to become. It is this model which is the typical family of the middle class.

The typical middle class family of today is a small nuclear family. A father, a mother, and two or three children, at most, has been the numerical pattern in recent years. Very recently, to be sure, the birth rate in such families has shown something of an increase. As yet, however, there is no way of predicting whether this upward fluctuation is to be permanent, or is merely the result of a wartime situation. Whatever the cause, it seems doubtful that the typical family size will be greatly enlarged. In addition to being small, this typical family is in many ways an isolated one. This is to say that it is an independent unit, both economically and socially. Even though its members always recognize the fact of relatives—grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins—the relational bonds with these relatives are not, in most cases, strong ones. Although personal preference may, and often does, make them strong, there are no binding rules—such as there are in Spanish-American society—which make it necessary always to accept and get along with relatives.

Let us take the relations between siblings in the typical American family as an example. It is easy to assume that the bonds of affection and antagonism experienced by the siblings as they grow up will gradually even out in adulthood and appear as permanent attachments. Yet an honest scrutiny of this
assumption will reveal that by the time they are thirty-five or forty years old, many of the members of the traditional middle-class family will be closer to their associates and friends than to their brothers and sisters. The actual separation and emotional distancing may be screened by sentimentality and last minute gestures on birthdays and anniversaries, but it is there all the same. It is frequently reinforced by the actual physical separation incident to the vigorous geographical mobility of middle-class Americans. But it is not only the ceaseless moving about that divides the members of the family. Quite frequently the gulf is widened by social distance. One sister’s husband is successful, another’s is not. As a result they live in different social orbits and seldom meet. Even if the two sisters maintain their relationship, it is unlikely that their children will have much in common or have many contacts with each other. In other cases, the dividing agent may be merely that the interests of the family of one sister are professionally focused and those of the other concentrated in the business world. With relationships as distant as cousins the instances of weakened bonds are still more numerous and more frequent.

If this is the situation where Collateral relationships are concerned, the weakening of the Lineal bonds among the generations is still more poignant. The son or daughter who moves away from parents both geographically and occupationally comes to sense an ever deepening emotional chasm in the relationship. In part this is linked with the deep strain on the dependent needs against which the child must strenuously defend himself if he or she is to fulfill the demands for independence and self-reliance occasioned by our value orientations. In part it is associated with the general sentimentalizing of family relationships which serves as a substitute for the lost closeness of parent and child. “Mother’s Day” is an example of one such sentimental bridge which helps us ignore the chasm below. A “rite of atonement” is what an analyst of American life has called our Mother’s Day customs.

It is not our intention to shock what may seem to be cynical objectivity, nor yet to place a value, positive or negative, upon our own value orientations and the customs in which they are reflected. Nevertheless, in all fairness, it must be pointed out that in some ways American family patterns put quite severe strains upon individuals. Since our aim is to present a method for dissecting out the mal-integrations in family patterns of living which underlie the mental ill-health of the individual, it is necessary to attempt to pin-point some of these strains.

A prominent source of difficulty is the situation of older people in our society. Excluded from living in the homes of their children, often retired from jobs merely because of age and thus cut off from the occupational interests which have absorbed their creative energies for so many years, older people tend to become increasingly isolated from meaningful relationships. As the life span grows longer and longer, the interest span for such persons tends to shorten. We have to some extent overcome the hazards of their inability to rely financially on their children through social security measures and the tremendous elaboration of insurance devices. But the gap which severs dependent relations between the generations makes it impossible for the aged to rely emotionally, as well as financially, on their children. Whereas the Spanish-American or Chinese parent would expect not only to live with his children but to receive their continued respect and devotion, older people in our society can expect to be told that they are old-fashioned, their opinions out of date, and their capacity to give helpful advice based on long experience with life strictly limited. With our impatient march into the future and our restless pursuit of change, the wisdom of an older generation is not likely to count for much. The Council of Elders is notable for its absence, and the role of elder statesman finds hardly an applicant. Thus the rewards of our intense planning for the future—if a person lives long enough—follow the law of diminishing returns.

Space does not permit here an inquiry into the complicated effects of this required separation between the generations on individual personality structure or on behavior disturbance in the individual. This is an area of intense research activity in the field of personality study, most of which is highly fruitful, even though the relation between cultural value orientations, social structuring, family patterns, and the individual’s adjustment is frequently not recognized. The sequence of relationships observed by Parsons and others with respect to the so-called American “youth culture” points to another kind of strain in the society. It is not generally understood that the behavior of the more or less typical American adolescent is not universal. In many other societies adolescence is a period of fairly smooth transition to adulthood. The wild fluctuations between extreme dependence and disdainful or defiant independence, the gyrations from idealism to cynicism, from lush romancing to hard-bitten, stripped-down sexual aims, and from cringing conformity to last ditch non-conformity are attitudes largely unique to our own social system. Threaded through all the adolescent attitudes is the power of the gang, or the adolescent peer group with its own, unique and frequently spectacular behavior patterns.

Parsons points out, discussing the origin of the power of the peer-group, that the adolescent in our society is caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, he grows up in a small, nuclear family in which all his dependent needs must be satisfied in relation with a very few persons. Consequently the libidinal attachment, especially to the mother, grows very strong. On the other hand, the child is expected to become an adult in whom extremes of self-reliance and independence can be easily mobilized. How is he to resolve this discontinuity between childhood training and adult expectations? The shadow of this dilemma is seen in almost every form of the neuroses of adult life. Adolescence is the hour when the first tentative solutions of pre-adolescence must be forged into workable instruments. If the individual waits until he attains adult status it may be too late, the solutions may not be forthcoming, and shame at not being able to make the grade may wither further experimentation. He may then become increasingly
trapped within his family, willed, perhaps, by a mother who cannot let him go, and scorned by father and friends who cannot tolerate his staying.

The adolescent peer group, then, is the mechanism through which the most workable solutions are provided. Instead of having to rupture his ties to his parents through a violent wrench as adulthood approaches, he can transfer them in part to his peers. Where his own lack of experience and uncertainty make it difficult to get along without the support of his parents, the solidarity of the peer group will back him up, whether or not his parents approve or disapprove of his behavior. Furthermore, the adolescent in our society is considerably inhibited in his attempts to try his wings and discover his own abilities and natural bent—in the words of Erik Erikson, to determine his personal sense of identity—by the prolonged tenure in the school setting. School is considered by most people to be chiefly a preparation for life, rather than an experience in its own right. Because of the technical requirements of our culture, it must be continued long after the adolescent has reached the point where he must determine his identity. As a result, however, the adolescent is sealed off from many of the aspects of the adult world which he is expected to be able to identify with and soon to master. This is perhaps the reason why so many young people develop neuroses, or at least discover their existence, after graduating from school, or at the point of graduation. At any rate, youth culture provides a framework of behavior half-way between the world of the child and the world of the adult. The roles in the peer group are distributed between those aimed at pleasure, play, and fun, and those whose goal is a serious "project." Even where the latter occasionally or frequently verge on delinquent or deviant goals—depending on the nature of the group—they nevertheless feature the orientation toward planning, organization, and achievement which are so important in our system of values.

Another source of strain in our family patterns can be found in the role of the father. One aspect of his role is the tremendous responsibility he must bear for the well-being of his children. In many societies—the Spanish-American, and Chinese, for example—no man is made to feel that he, and he alone, is solely responsible for the well-being of his family. There are parents, brothers, even uncles and cousins, to be called upon in times of crisis. Many American men feel that they would rather borrow from a friend or even a stranger than from a relative—so strong is the push toward independence. The proliferation of welfare agencies and other community mechanisms for absorbing the slack between emotional and financial income and output are becoming more acceptable but still encounter the resistance toward "accepting help" or "charity" associated with our value system.

The great resourcefulness and responsibility required in the father role is well integrated with the doing aspects of his orientation toward life. As a result he is apt to be highly concentrated on his business or occupational role. There are several ways, however, in which this concentration is not so well integrated with other family roles. It means that he must, in the usual case, spend an enormous amount of time away from his home and family. Thus the amount of sharing of roles—of real companionship—between husband and wife comes to be reduced frequently far below the optimum, and the marital pair find themselves driven increasingly apart as their marriage progresses. Another strain arises with respect to the father-son roles. With father out of the home so much, the son is thrown very much together with mother. Not only are the mutual bonds thus intensified, but also the mother must then carry the lion’s share of the training of the children and instituting of controls. She tends to assume a disproportionate amount of the moral authority for the whole family. For the son this means that the distribution of internalized traits which compose his psychological identifications with his parents is heavily weighted toward mother. The resulting feminine identification—especially the feminine superego—as well as the strong affective tie toward her then constitute mechanisms difficult to integrate later on with the initiative and aggressiveness demanded by ego ideals in accord with our value system. This situation is not helped by the fact that father’s occupation often remains a mystery to the son. His occupation is obviously a focus of great interest and value and, therefore, an important way of identifying father and of identifying with him. Yet middle class occupations take place, for the most part, far from home and are difficult to describe operationally. How many middle class sons know what their extremely active fathers really do on the job?

But none of these strains are as severe as those found in the wife-mother role. Indeed, if we were asked to point to the most strategic spot in the American family system for an effecting of constructive change in it, we would certainly single out the feminine role. The reasons for the choice are many, and the whole of the feminine role problem which obviously includes the difficulties in both the husband-wife and the mother-child relationship is exceedingly complex. Here we shall point out only a few of the major strains which relate to the differential participation women are permitted in the patterns which express the dominant American value-orientations.

Compared to the masculine role, that aspect of the total feminine role which we label the wife-mother role is not well geared into the dominant value system. The mother of a family is not expected to express herself in an individualistic autonomous role in the way the father does in the occupational system. Instead she is expected to have a collateral orientation in which she puts the interests of the group as a whole above whatever individualistic interests she may have. She is, much more than the father, expected to play a "representative" role in her relations outside the family. She may, for example, be representative in the sense of being a husband’s status symbol. Thorsten Veblen pointed this fact out long ago when he remarked that the American woman, in certain strata of society at least, is the symbol of a husband’s or father’s ability to pay and is in herself an item of conspicuous consumption. More often, today, the representativeness is found in the expectations we have that mothers will be the ones to represent the
family at parent-teacher meetings, in the community churches and in a host of other community affairs. There is even a rapidly growing trend, especially in suburbs, for women to take a far more active part than men in community governmental affairs. Everyone is aware, for example, of the work that groups such as the League of Women Voters do in this field of activity.

Some women find a great deal of satisfaction in such roles. Some find satisfactions in the work of women’s clubs, book clubs, music or art organizations. However, many do not. In the first place, the various activities have a diffuseness which do not permit to women the concentration upon central goals which is so characteristic a part of the dominant American achievement patterns. Second, almost all of the specified activities are mainly defined as women’s activities in which men do not participate, and such a definition not only leads to an ever widening segregation of the spheres of the sexes but also tends to give to the activities themselves an evaluation of second order importance. It is almost as if it were being said that men should tend to the truly important affairs in American life—those relating to the sphere of the economic—while the necessary matters of lesser importance can be safely left to women up to the point that issues become critical.

Even though there has been an increasing acceptance of women in the all important occupational system—a fact which is evidenced by Labor Bureau statistics which record some 18,000,000 women in the labor force—there still is an expression of grave concern about the mother who works outside the home. Often a definite condemnation of the working mother is expressed. Delinquency, psychological disturbances of all kinds in children and the divorce rate as well are frequently attributed in some large part to the fact of the mother being out of the home on a job. The American mother is not, in other words, expected to have an active part in those aspects of American life which best express the Doing activity and Future Time orientations. Hers is a vicarious participation which depends upon what a husband, a father or a son, and not she herself accomplishes.

The frustrations which result from these variant definitions of woman’s role would not be serious if it were not for the two facts that the domestic component of the wife-mother role has been increasingly demeaned as a prestige role and that women have been poorly trained to play that part of the total role.

In most respects American girls from babyhood through adolescence are trained to play individualistic and competitive roles which are very similar in nature to the masculine roles. Throughout childhood and youth the girl child goes to school with boys and competes for many of the same goals. True, little sister may find a doll and carriage under the Christmas tree while brother has a train, but in spite of this or other differences it is expected that the girl will learn to look after herself all through adolescence and beyond, even forever if need be. The hope is expressed that she will not have to remain indepen-
is subjected tells her that she should not spoil her children’s lives, that she should let them lead their own lives, that she should make them independent and self-sufficient. Yet the more faithfully she obeys these injunctions, the more she is working herself out of a job. Some day, while she is still a young woman ... she will be alone, quite alone, in a home of her own.22

In an action oriented, future-time minded society, having no job to do engenders a feeling of uselessness which in turn creates emotional disturbance. Most of us have witnessed the disoriented behavior and emotional stress of women whose children have grown up and gone. Some respond by clinging to children; others try desperately to fit into jobs with the outmoded skills they learned and used years ago; others become unnecessarily fussy housewives; some are merely restless. But whatever the response or the degree of disorientation it should be plain that the demands of a role which is patterned rather inconsistently in terms of both dominant and variant value orientations are not easily met. There is considerable confusion in the minds of many women as to just what is expected of them, and the confusion affects all family relationships.

But in this instance as well as all others we have stressed the existence of problems not to demonstrate that the dominant family system is falling apart, but rather to set up an analytical model for the isolating of some of the processes related to psychological strain and ill health. In fact, if it were our purpose, we could devote an equal if not greater amount of space to demonstrating successful integrations within family patterns, and among the family, the social system and the system of value orientations. Given our basic values, the typical roles within the middle-class family structure appear, on the whole, to be well fitted to the functions of the family within the larger social system. The system of individualistic roles and autonomous functions within the family is rewarded by well suited to and good preparation for the degrees of freedom and independence which our industrial society calls for. The weakening of ties between the generations is practically mandatory if the family is to be adjusted to the amount of freedom for geographical and social mobility which our occupational system requires. Such an accounting of the good fits within and around the family is part of the well balanced appraisal which this report can only suggest, rather than document.

**CONCLUSION**

In concluding this first report, it is perhaps wise to review what we have not attempted as well as what we have aimed for. We have not attempted to give an account of the status of current research in family problems, useful as this might be. We have hoped, rather, that this necessarily schematic outline of a method for analyzing family problems will help to relate and correlate much of the vigorous research now going on. We hope that the demonstration of the inter-relations between various parts of the transactional field within which family problems are set will help research workers coming from different disciplines and different approaches to become more aware of the importance and meaning of their work for each other. We have not attempted to set forth any practical approaches to the problems of integration which we have tried to isolate. Again many scientific and professional workers—psychiatrists, sociologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, social workers, and family counsellors—are attacking these problems. Perhaps they will be able to draw from our report a widened perspective or a more definite view of the team-like nature of all of their exploratory and therapeutic efforts. In our view the concept of “mental hygiene” should be widened to include a study of all the mental-integrations and strains that exist in all parts of the transactional field. Certainly mental health is not the responsibility of any one professional group.

Our story is very incomplete. We have described only a few aspects of the “typical” dominant American family. Even if we should have taken the space to describe this family picture in greater detail, we would have produced only a distorted view of American family life. No particular family corresponds with this generalized model. If we were to take a particular family as a case study, we would have to locate it along some axis of transition from local, regional, class, and ethnic variables to the idealized dominant American pattern. In the meantime, we hope that we have presented a set of working principles and a method for isolating variance and conflict in family behavior. We believe that the description of such behavior patterns in terms of social roles is the crux of the method, and that the relation of social roles to the specific variable items in the system of cultural value orientations, to the structure and function of the social system, and to the motivational processes of the individual, constitutes a set of working principles.

**NOTES AND REFERENCES**

1. This Report does not include a review of the literature on the topic of the family nor does it scan the various points of view that have been used by investigators conducting research on family affairs. Readers of the Report may, however, become curious about one or another aspect of the family which we fail to discuss and may wonder where they could find further information. For this reason we here reproduce "A Bibliography of Family Classics" prepared by Professor Reuben Hill of the University of North Carolina for his revision of Willard Waller’s textbook on the family (Waller, Willard and Hill, Reuben: *The Family: a Dynamic Interpretation*, New York, The Dryden Press (1951)). This bibliography, which is reproduced with the permission of the author and the publishers, represents a sensitive and critical appraisal, as well as a list of the outstanding publications in this area:

"Any study of the family is dependent upon a great number of studies which have gone before. . . . In order to see our task in perspective, therefore, it is desirable to review briefly some of the
principal contributions to the literature of the field.

"The value of the historical approach to the study of the family has long been recognized. Some of the devoted and painstaking scholars of an earlier generation made this field their life work. One thinks at once of G. E. Howard's monumental History of Matrimonial Institutions (University of Chicago, 1904) and of E. A. Westermarck's classic History of Human Marriage (Macmillan, 1921). Robert Bliffaut took issue with Westermarck as to the origin of the family in The Mothers (Macmillan, 1927). The Marxian theory of the family was set forth by Friedrich Engels in The Origin of the Family (Kerr, 1910). C. C. Zimmerman, in Family and Civilization (Harper, 1947), has amassed a wealth of historical data on the Western family from Homeric Greek times to the present to support his conceptual scheme that all societies oscillate over time from powerful trustee family types to weak atomistic family forms, pausing for a period in between to elaborate the type of "middle strength," the domestic family. The story of the family on the American scene has been exhaustively set forth by A. W. Calhoun in his Social History of the American Family from Colonial Times to the Present (Clark, 1917-1919; reprinted Barnes & Noble, 1945). Willystine Goodsell, in A History of Marriage and the Family (rev. ed., Macmillan, 1934), has given us an excellent and up-to-date summary.

"The study of the family in non-literate societies has contributed an invaluable perspective with which to view family life in our own society. Helpful treatises of nonliterate societies in general are the following: A. J. Todd, The Primitive Family as an Education Agency (Putnam, 1913); Nathan Miller, The Child in Primitive Society (Brentano, 1928); Ernest C. Chealey, The Mound Builder (edition revised by Basterman, Boni & Liveright, 1927); and W. G. Sumner, Folkways (Ginn, 1907).

"In recent years the emphasis has shifted from the study of specific institutions in all nonliterate societies to the more detailed study of one society. Excellent examples of the latter approach are the following: Margaret Mead, Sex and Temperament (Morrow, 1935); Bronislaw Malinowsky, The Sexual Life of Savages (Halcyon House, 1929); R. K. Fortune, Sorcerers of Dobu (Routledge, 1932); Hortense Powdermaker, Life in Lesu (Norton, 1933); Robert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan (University of Chicago, 1941); and Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Penguin, 1946). Recently a number of literate societies have been studied by methods which have been perfected on nonliterate societies; the studies are legion, but the following are representative: Conrad M. Arensberg, The Irish Countryside (Macmillan, 1937); John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life (Columbia University, 1944); W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant (Knopf, 1927); and Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society (Yale University, 1946). These books are merely representative titles in a field which is growing rapidly.

"The study of the family as a social institution is one of the central tasks of all sociological study of the family. The work of Frederick LePlay, Le Reforme social (Mame, 1872, 7th ed., 1887) and L'Organisation de la famille, (Mame, 1875, 3d ed., 1884) seems to be pervaded by this theme. In our generation LePlay is best represented by C. C. Zimmerman, in a book with M. E. Frampton, Family and Society (Van Nostrand, 1935). M. C. Elmer has made the family as an institution the focal point of his Sociology of the Family (Ginn, 1945). The work of Ogburn and Groves also bears heavily on this theme; see W. F. Ogburn and E. R. Groves, American Marriage and Family Relationships (Holt, 1928).

"The sexual aspects of family life have been investigated by a great number of students. One of the sanest of these was Havelock Ellis, whose Psychology of Sex (Emerson, 1935) serves as a brief introduction to his work. Katherine B. Davis' Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women (Harper, 1929) was a groundbreaking study, but the public interest was really captured fourteen years later by the now famous Kinsey report on the sex life of the American male; see Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (Saunders, 1948).


"The psychoanalysts have been persistent, daring, and ingenious students of the family. Representative titles from the writings of this school are the following: Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (Riviere translation, Liveright, 1935); J. C. Flugel, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family (4th ed., L. and V. Woolf, Hogarth Press, 1931); Ernest Jones, Papers on Psychoanalysis (Wood, 1919); Alfred Adler, The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology (Harcourt, Brace, 1932); Otto Rank, The Trauma of Birth (Harcourt, Brace, 1929); Sandor Ferenczi, Contributions to Psychoanalysis (Badger, 1916); C. G. Jung, Psychological Types (Harcourt, Brace, 1926); and J. S. van Tesla, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (a symposium, Modern Library, 1925). William Healy, Augusta Bronner, and Anna Bowers have given us a definitive volume on psychoanaly-
sis in *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis* (Knopf, 1931), John Dollard's *volume, Criteria for the Life History* (Yale, 1935), and the delightfully written interpretation of family life by John Levy and Ruth Munroe, *The Happy Family* (Knopf, 1938) should probably be classified with the psychoanalytic school.

"There have been many concrete studies which throw light upon one or more aspects of family life. G. V. Hamilton's *A Research in Marriage* (Lear, 1948) was a pioneer study. Two marital-prediction studies which reach into every marriage-and-family class discussion warrant attention: Lewis M. Terman and associates, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (McGraw-Hill, 1938) and Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (Prentice-Hall, 1939).

"The considerable literature on the reactions of families to crises of dismemberment and demoralization reveals much about the strengths and weaknesses of American family structure and American community organization. Representative titles are: R. C. Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (Scribner, 1936); Ruth Cavan and Katherine Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (University of Chicago, 1938); Reuben Hill, *Families under Stress* (Harper, 1949), a study of family adjustments to the war-born crises of separation and reunion; Mirra Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family* (Dryden, 1940); Earl L. Koo, *Families in Trouble* (King's Crown, 1946); and Katherine Lumpkin, *The Family, a Study of Member Roles* (University of North Carolina, 1933). A provocative analysis of family situations from the standpoint of structure, process, and content is provided in James H. S. Bossard and Eleanor S. Boll, *Family Situations* (University of Pennsylvania, 1943). *The Taxi-dance Hall* by Paul G. Cressey (University of Chicago, 1932) will be found particularly valuable to the student of the present volume because of the material which it contains concerning the bargaining and exploitative attitudes of the unmarried.

"Divorce has been studied a great deal, although much remains to be said on the subject. J. P. Lichtnerberger, in *Divorce, A Social Interpretation* (McGraw-Hill, 1931), has given us a very broad treatment of the subject. *Family Disorganization*, by E. R. Mowrer (University of Chicago, 1928), casts light upon interaction processes leading to divorce. Willard Waller's *The Old Love and the New, Divorce and Readjustment* (Liveright, 1930) is a study of the effects of divorce upon personality.

"There have been many "points of view" books concerning marriage and the family. *Love and Marriage*, by the famous feminist Ellen Key (Putnam, 1912), was one of these. *The Bankruptcy of Marriage*, a symposium edited by H. Keyserling (Harcourt, Brace, 1946), appears to ride no particular hobby, its principal appeal seems to have been the extreme opinions expressed by some of the contributors. *Marriage and Mor-

als*, by Bertrand Russell (Liveright, 1929), and *The Companionate Marriage*, by Ben Lindsey and Wainwright Evans (Garden City, 1929), propose changes in the moral code of the family. Floyd Dell's *Love in the Machine Age* (Farrar & Rinehart, 1930) was an attempt to popularize a fairly well-established way of thinking about the family. Denis de Rougemont has written a scathing denunciation of romantic love, ascribing to it a large part of the evils and suffering of the modern world, in his *Love in the Western World* (Harcourt, Brace, 1940).

"During recent years, books intended to be used as texts in college courses on marriage and the family have appeared at a rapid rate. These textbooks are tailored to meet the demands of many different courses ranging from the frankly functional texts dealing with the questions raised by students and written in their own language by Harry M. Boas, *Marriage for Moderns* (McGraw-Hill, 1947); Evelyn McDufree and Reuben Hill, *When you Marry* (Heath, 1945); Robert A. Harper, *Marriage* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949); and Judson and Mary Landis, *Building a Successful Marriage* (Prentice-Hall, 1948); to the scholarly volumes prepared primarily from the perspective of the writer-scientist by Joseph K. Folsom, *The Family in Democratic Society* (Wiley, 1943); Jessie Bernard, *American Family Behavior* (Harper, 1942); and Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey Locke, *The Family from Institution to Companionship* (American Book, 1945). Books which purport to meet the needs both of the student with questions about courtship, marriage, and parenthood and of the student interested in the family as a subject for analysis are most numerous of all: Ray E. Baber, *Marriage and the Family* (Crowell, 1942); Harold T. Christensen, *Marriage Analysis* (Ronald, 1950); Andrew Truxall and Francis Merrill, *The Family in American Culture* (Prentice-Hall, 1947); Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Marriage and the Family* (Houghton Mifflin, 1947); and Paul Landis, *Your Marriage and Family Living* (McGraw-Hill, 1946); written for high school students. . . ."

In reaching this goal, the Committee was much influenced and guided by the research work and point of view of Dr. Erich Lindemann, who served as an early advisor to our first groping for an objective. His view of the significance of role relations within the family and the community to the physical and mental health of the individual is illustrated in his writings. (Cf. Erich Lindemann: "Modifications in the Course of Ulcerative Colitis in Relationship to Changes in Life Situations and Reaction Patterns." Chapter XLVII in *Life Stress and Bodily Disease.* (Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins Co., 1950.)

The term, *transaction*, and the concept it embodies is used throughout this report. It was first used, in a scientific sense, about seventy-five years ago by the British mathematician and physicist, Clerk-Maxwell, in the preface to his book *Matter and Motion*. He used it to describe the inter-
penetration of processes in a physical field independent of any organized or detachable entities. Its contemporary usage, however, derives from the writings of John Dewey and A. F. Bentley. *Knowing and the Known* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1949). Bentley has recently summarized his point of view in an article entitled “Kennetic Inquiry” (A. F. Bentley: *Science*, 112: 775, 1950).

Transaction stands in distinction to the concepts denoted by the terms self-action and interaction. Which concept is used for the description of behavior depends partly on the position and viewpoint of the observer and partly on the particular phenomena observed. Self-action signifies behavior springing from the internal, preset, wound-up condition of a detached, organized entity, like a clock. The concept of instinct and of the hereditary development of the organism is self-action concepts. Interaction refers to the effect upon each other of organized, detached entities such as the behavior of billiard balls or gas molecules. The notions of classical physics such as the Newtonian laws of gravity are based on interaction concepts. So is the term, interpersonal relations, insofar as it describes the effects upon each other’s behavior of discrete personalities. Transaction, on the other hand, describes the inter-penetration and mutual, reverberating, and reciprocal effects of processes which can no longer be referred to organized, detachable entities. It is here rather a question of system in process with system. Biochemical systems have this characteristic, as do most of the processes which are denoted by the term homeostasis. The equilibrium-maintaining, self-correcting systems involved in cybernetics and communications engineering are also transactional in orientation.

The various sciences concerned with the study of human behavior have not taken pains to distinguish between self-action, interaction, and transaction points of view. Human behavior becomes transactional, however, either when viewed macroscopically—*i.e.* as a system of human relations constituting a human society—or microscopically—as a system of psychosomatic processes in which no one individual behaves as a completely self-directing (autonomous, self-acting) or even as a completely self-conscious (aware of the influence of others, interacting) entity. Looked at in this way, it is a complex network of processes rather than an individual personality or even a group that determines behavior.

In a way, transactional concepts imply a study of function at the cost of structure. Or, to put it differently, structure appears as but a static cross-section version of function—like a sudden stopping of the motion-picture projection of the ongoing processes of life. Nevertheless, structure does not disappear altogether, but becomes increasingly difficult to characterize. Events must still occur somewhere in space in some sort of orderly relation to each other. It was out of such considerations as these that one of the Committee members, Dr. John P. Spiegel, was moved to characterize the persistent, structure-like aspects of transactional relations as a field of transaction. In a forthcoming publication, entitled “Transactional Foci within a Total Field as Determinants of Human Behavior,” he has attempted to describe the field of transaction as a matrix of inter-penetrating systems within which can be discerned foci of organization. The assumption of six major foci of organization and their relations within the field of transaction described in that paper form the basis for the mode of presentation employed in this report.


6. The concept of role has received more attention in the fields of sociology, anthropology, and social psychology than in psychiatry and clinical psychology. Of relatively recent origin, it has been used in different ways and still remains remarkably unstandardized and changeable in the hands of various authors. In spite of the conceptual instability its potential usefulness promises to be great. A good if contentious review of the development of the concept is given by Neiman and Hughes (Lionel J. Neiman and James W. Hughes: The Problem of the Concept of Role—a Resurvey of the Literature, *Social Forces* 30: 141-149, December, 1951). The version of the concept used in this report is based principally on the writings of Talcott Parsons: *The Social System*. (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1951) see especially pages 36-45.


9. Actually the use of the terms needs and drives involves a non-transactional language. The alert reader will probably discover many other deviations from transactional concepts throughout this presentation, but this particular departure is so dramatic as to deserve special comment. It is evident that the concept of need and drive fractures the totality of the field of transaction and locates processes that occur between the organism as a system and the environment as a system as if they existed wholly within the organism. A need is presumably a “pull” from within the organism toward a prescribed “goal” in the outer environment. The goal is what is needed. A drive, on the other hand, is a “push” from within the organism representing a presumably definite
quantum of energy which must be "expressed" — that is, manifested by some output of the energy in the form of an action process or behavior. In both of these concepts the environment is conceived on the basis of a concealed assumption as if it were entirely passive to all the activity within the organism. It is simply "out there," standing by, so to speak. Yet, if the area of observation is broadened, it then appears that the environment itself is not so passive, but, to pursue the metaphor, has its own needs and drives with respect to the organism. The organism cannot behave in any old random fashion for very long (and continue to exist) because it is continuously being pushed and pulled by the drives and needs of the environment. At this stage of the conceptual system, the metaphorical principle is reduced to the absurdity: which has the drive and which has the need.


12. The most familiar names among the anthropologists who have been concerned with the problem are: A. L. Kroeber, Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, Clyde Kluckhohn, Margaret Mead, Laura Thompson, Gregory Bateson and Morris Opler. Some of the concepts developed to designate basic values and "unconscious canons of choice" (Sapir); "unconscious system of meanings" (Benedict); "configurations" (Kluckhohn); "cultural themes" (Opler); "core culture" (Thompson).


16. The material on both the Spanish-American and American family patterns has been adapted, with the permission of the publisher, from Florence R. Kluckhohn's chapter entitled "The American Family Past and Present" in *Patterns for Modern Living: Psychological Patterns*, ed. O. H. Mowrer. Chicago, Ill., The Delphian Society, 1952.


18. Sentimentality, in this context, means an increasing emphasis on the symbolic aspects of the relationships which simultaneously become emptied of significant content.


21. The material on the feminine role in United States culture has been adapted from Florence R. Kluckhohn, "America's Women," op. cit. chapter 3.


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